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“RE-EVALUATING COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL” 
Hon. Justice David Collins 
ABSTRACT 
The current federal law governing a defendant’s competence to stand trial is substantially 
contained in 18 U.S.C. § 4241 that can be traced to a 1949 statute and, in Dusky v. United 
States, a three paragraph opinion of the Supreme Court, delivered in 1960.  The federal statute 
was initially drafted by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States.  Thus, 
material aspects of the federal tests for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial were 
composed by federal judges.   
This paper explains why the current federal law concerning a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial is antiquated and no longer fit for purpose.  The deficiencies in the current law primarily 
stem from the fact that the legislative test is confined to defendants who suffer a “mental disease 
or defect” that renders them incompetent and fails to address the circumstances of defendants 
whose incompetence is caused by other factors, including psychological and neurological 
conditions.  The Dusky test, while more broadly based than 18 U.S.C. § 4241 also suffers from 
a number of limitations and has led to conflicting decisions from the Supreme Court and 
significant uncertainty about its scope.  As responsibility for the deficiencies in the current 
federal law rests almost entirely with the federal judiciary, this paper suggests that federal 
judges should address the errors of their predecessors and reform the way a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial is assessed.  This can be achieved by the Supreme Court, in an 
appropriate case, revisiting its decision in Dusky and adopting a test that focuses upon a 
defendant’s ability to effectively participate in their trial.  The effective participation test is 
2 
 
derived from jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, and has recently been 
endorsed by the Law Commission of England and Wales.  It is a test that is gaining international 
traction and is one that would enhance the way the law responds to a significant cohort of 
defendants in the federal criminal justice system. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
The term, “competence to stand trial” refers to a defendant’s ability to “participate” in their 
trial,1 and encompasses those who plead guilty2 and those who are to be sentenced.3  This paper 
examines the current federal law governing a defendant’s competence to stand trial in the 
federal criminal jurisdiction and identifies a number of deficiencies in the current law.  It 
proposes a new test whereby a defendant’s competence to stand trial would be determined by 
reference to their capacity to participate effectively in their trial.   
Summary of the current federal law and its consequences 
The development of the federal law concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial, and its 
consequences, is the focus of Part II of this paper.  The principal federal statute governing a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial – 18 U.S.C. § 4241 – has been correctly characterised as 
a “complex enactment”,4 that was initially drafted by a committee of the United States Judicial 
                                                          
1  Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence 
to Stand Trial, 35(4) J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S3, S3 (2007).   
2  By far the vast majority of defendants in the federal criminal justice system plead guilty.  In 2016 97.3% of 
federal offenders pleaded guilty.  This rate has been consistent for more than 15 years:  U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 2016, 4 (May 2017).  Some authorities 
have suggested that because most defendants plead guilty before trial, the term “competence to stand trial” 
is misleading.  They suggest terms such as “adjudicative competence” or “competence to proceed” are more 
apposite (Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10(3) 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291, 291-316 (1992)); (NORMAN G. POYTHRESS, RICHARD J. BONNIE, JOHN MONAHAN, 
RANDY OTTO & STEVEN K. HOGE, ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE – THE MACARTHUR STUDIES (Ronald 
Roesch et al. eds., 2002)).  The term “competence to stand trial” is however, well ingrained in American 
jurisprudence as referring to a defendant’s competence at all stages of criminal proceedings, from the laying 
of charges to sentencing: Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); 
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).  That is the way the competence to stand trial concept is referred to 
in this paper.   
3  United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
4  FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 51 (Mar. 2013). 
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Conference between 1942 and 1946 and enacted in 1949.  That legislation applies only to 
defendants suffering from “a mental disease or defect” that renders him or her “mentally 
incompetent to the extent that [they are] unable to understand the nature and consequences of 
the proceeding against [them] or to assist properly in [their] defense”.  Deficiencies in the 
current federal legislation were not alleviated to any significant extent when, in 1960, the 
Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Dusky v United States,5 the Court’s leading decision 
concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  In its three paragraph opinion the Court 
said a defendant’s competence to stand trial depends upon:6 
“… whether he [or she] has sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he [or she] has a 
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her].” 
In Drope v. Missouri,7 the Supreme Court summarized aspects of the Dusky test when it said a 
defendant must have the “capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings 
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing [their] defense”.  The emphasis 
is upon the defendant’s capacity, thus, conscious decisions by a defendant not to understand, 
consult or assist their counsel do not satisfy the Dusky test.8  It is the defendant who carries the 
burden of demonstrating, on the preponderance of the evidence, that they are not competent to 
stand trial.9  Research indicates that in the United States, between 50,000 and 60,000 
defendants undergo competence assessments each year.10  Of those who are assessed, 
approximately 15,000 defendants are found to be not competent to stand trial.11 
                                                          
5  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 403 (1960). 
6  Id. at 402. 
7  Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.  
8  Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 432 (4th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Battle, 613 F.3d 258, 263 (D.C. Cir. 
2010). 
9  United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2005). 
10  Douglas R. Morris & Nathaniel J. DeYoung, Psycholegal Abilities and Restoration of Competence to Stand 
Trial, 30 BEHAV. SCI. &. L., 710, 710-728 (2012); Gianni Pirelli, William H. Gottdiener & Patricia A. Zapf, 
A Meta-Analytic Review of Compentency to Stand Trial Research, 17(1) PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 2, 1-53 
(2011); Mossman, et al., supra note 1, at S3. 
11  Pirelli, et al., supra note 10, at 3; Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Competency to Stand Trial: A Guideline 
for Evaluators, in THE HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 305-331 (Allen K. Hess & Irving B. Weiner 
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The consequences of a finding that a defendant is not competent to stand trial includes 
significant curtailment of their liberty, which is elaborated on in Part II.  Thus, a finding that a 
defendant is not competent to stand trial is rarely perceived as a victory for the defendant.  It is 
therefore not surprising to find cases in which a defendant has expressly instructed their 
attorney not to challenge their competence to stand trial.12 
Summary of the key deficiencies in the current law 
The jurisprudential and institutional difficulties arising from the deficiencies in the federal 
legislation and case law concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial are examined in 
Part III of this paper.  Those deficiencies include the narrowness of the criteria for a defendant 
to be declared incompetent to stand trial.  This has meant that many defendants with significant 
mental illness have been found competent to stand trial.13  This in turn has contributed to an 
intolerable phenomenon in United States prisons, namely the “criminalization of mental 
illness”.14  One estimate suggests there are ten times as many people with mental illnesses in 
jails and prisons in the United States as there are in all psychiatric hospitals.15  It has been 
                                                          
eds., 3rd ed. 2006); Daniel C. Murrie et al., Opinion Formation in Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 
Results from 8,146 Evaluations, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 113-132 (2006).  There are few published statistics 
concerning the frequency of competence hearings in the United States.  The Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts has stated that Federal Magistrate Judges conducted 610 criminal competency 
proceedings in the 12 month period ending September 30 2016, an increase from the 439 competency 
hearings they conducted in the preceding 12 month period.  The Administrative Office does not however 
publish statistics on the number of competency hearings conducted by Federal District Court Judges.  It is 
therefore not possible to accurately determine what proportion of the 77,357 criminal proceedings 
commenced in the federal courts in the year ending September 30 2016 resulted in competency hearings.  
See United States Courts:  Judicial Business Table M-4 U.S. District Courts Criminal Pre-Trial Matters 
Conducted by U.S. Magistrate Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) During the 12-Month Period Ending 
September 30, 2015 and 2016 and Judicial Business 2016: Caseload Highlights: U.S. District Courts: 
Criminal Filings, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2016-tables (last visited June 
12, 2017). 
12  See State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W. 2d 176 (1986) discussed in Rodney J. Uphoff, Role of the 
Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer 
of the Court?, WIS. L. REV. 65, 77-98 (1988). 
13  For example, United States v. Riggin, 732 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Ind. 1990), United States v. Mitchell, 706 F. 
Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Utah. 2010) at 1193 and Bradley v. Preston, 263 F. Supp. 283 (D.C. Cir. 1967).  
14  RISDON N. SLATE, JACQUELINE K. BUFFINGTON-VOLLUM & W. WESLEY JOHNSON, THE CRIMINALIZATION 
OF MENTAL ILLNESS: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 43 (2d ed. 2013). 
15  E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN 
PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY, (Treatment Advocacy Center, 2014). 
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suggested there are nearly 1.2 million people with mental illnesses in jails and prisons 
throughout the United States.16  
The narrowness of the qualifying criteria in the current federal tests governing a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial has also led to ad hoc and at times inconsistent outcomes where 
defendants are incapacitated by conditions that do not fit into the current incompetency criteria.  
Defendants with profound personality disorders (which are not a mental disease or defect) and 
those who suffer from neurological disorders, such as amnesia are two classes of defendants 
that have created challenges for federal courts called upon to determine if such defendants lack 
the requisite competence to stand trial.  As explained in Part III, these cases have led to 
inconsistent outcomes and illustrate the difficulties caused by the preoccupation of the federal 
law with the causes of a defendant’s possible incompetence rather than the effects of a 
defendant’s condition upon their ability to participate in their trial.  Other forms of incapacity 
are not pursued in this paper but could also be examined to demonstrate the difficulties 
generated by the federal laws myopic focus on the causes of a defendant’s incompetence to 
stand trial.  For example, defendants who are incapacitated through medication are dealt with 
differently from defendants who are incapacitated by using illegal drugs, even though both 
categories of defendants may exhibit identical symptoms and suffer the same inability to 
participate in their trials.17  Similarly, defendants who suffer from physical disabilities18 such 
                                                          
16  Jillian Peterson, Mental Illness Not Usually Linked to Crime, Research Finds (Am. Psychol. Ass’n, 2014), 
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/04/mental-illness-crime.aspx. 
17  In Whitehead v. Wainwright, 609 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1980) a defendant who had been administered 
tranquilizers and subsequently fell asleep during his trial was held not to have been competent to stand trial.  
In Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1996) a defendant who consistently fell asleep during his trial 
after using illicit drugs was held by a majority of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to have been 
competent to stand trial.  The issue as to whether Watts should have been treated differently from Whitehead 
because Watts had voluntarily used incapacitating illicit drugs was not explored in the majority’s judgment. 
18  Physical incompetence is not covered by any federal competency statute and is treated as an issue for trial 
courts to assess on a case by case basis by reference to five factors identified in United States v. Doran, 328 
F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).  Those factors are the medical evidence, the defendant’s activities 
outside of the courthouse, the possibility of measures to minimise the risks to the defendant’s health when 
subjecting them to trial, the temporary or permanent character of the physical problem and the magnitude 
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as deafness19 or cancer20 can face difficult hurdles when demonstrating their incapacity to stand 
trial. 
Also troubling is the assessment of unrepresented defendants21 to stand trial.  Two decisions 
from the Supreme Court concerning the competence of unrepresented defendants to stand 
trial22 have produced a disconcerting body of jurisprudence that attempts to draw a distinction 
between a defendant’s competence to plead guilty and their competence to conduct a defended 
hearing without counsel.  The difficulties created by the approaches taken by the Supreme 
Court in these cases are examined in further detail in Part III. 
Further issues have developed in relation to the way the concept of rationality has unfolded in 
cases decided after Dusky.  The requirement in the Dusky test that a defendant have the ability 
to consult with their lawyer with a “reasonable degree of rational understanding” and have “a 
rational … understanding of the proceedings against [them]” has not been universally 
understood or embraced.  Subsequent decisions from the Supreme Court have generated 
confusion about what the Supreme Court meant when it referred to a defendant having a 
“rational understanding”.23  This issue is explored in Part III which also contains an explanation 
                                                          
and seriousness of the case, i.e., the public interest in continuing with the trial.  Refer also United States v. 
Knohl, 379 F.2d 427, 436 (2nd Cir. 1967) cert denied 389 U.S. 973, 88 S. Ct. 472 (1967); United States v. 
Jones, 876 F. Supp. 395, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y 1997). 
19  In State v. Burnett, No.20496 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2005) a defendant’s inability to communicate because of his 
deafness was equated with mental incompetence.  In Jones, 876 F. Supp. a deaf defendant who could not 
understand sign language was held to be “physically incompetent” to stand trial. 
20  In United States v. DeNunzio, 174 F. Supp. 3d 582 (D. Mass. 2016) a defendant who was recovering from 
chemotherapy was held to be competent to stand trial because requiring him to stand trial would not endanger 
his life or health.  In contrast, in United States v. Reddy, No.01 CR0058(LTS) (S.D.N.Y. 2003) a defendant 
suffering cancer that the government argued was in remission was held to be not competent to stand trial. 
21  The terms pro se and “self-represented” are not used in this paper.  Instead defendants who do not have the 
benefit of counsel are described as being “unrepresented” as this more accurately describes the reality of 
their circumstances. 
22  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) & Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
23  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) and Godinez, 509 U.S.. 
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of the importance of a defendant having a rational understanding of the relevant aspects of their 
trial in order to be competent to stand trial. 
There are also challenges under the current law for clinicians engaged in assessing a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Assessing defendants whose competence to stand trial 
has become “a core skill” in forensic psychiatry.24  Competency to stand trial evaluations are 
also now “by far the most frequently adjudicated” form of competency in the judicial system.25  
The frequency and importance of assessments of a defendant’s competence to stand trial places 
considerable pressure on health professionals engaged in these assessments to ensure their 
recommendations are sound.  A closely related deficiency in the current federal law concerning 
a defendant’s competence to stand trial relates to the institutional difficulties that arise from 
the way in which a defendant’s competence is currently assessed.  This issue has evolved as 
psychologists and psychiatrists have developed screening instruments, of varying qualities, that 
have become the focal point of assessments of a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  The 
defects in screening instruments and the importance of lawyers and judges in testing the 
validity of the conclusions reached by health professionals is examined in further detail in 
Part III. 
The analysis in Part III leads to the conclusion that the current federal law governing a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial is antiquated and no longer fit for purpose.  The challenge 
that then arises is to propose a new test for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
That assignment is undertaken in Part IV of this paper. 
                                                          
24  Mossman, et al., supra note 1. 
25  GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA, NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (3rd ed. 
2007); Derek Chiswick, Fitness to Stand Trial and Plead, Mutism and Deafness, in 171 PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (Robert Bluglass and Paul Bowden eds., 1990). 
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Guiding principles 
Any test for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial must be firmly grounded upon 
an understanding as to why the criminal justice system should only place on trial those who are 
competent.  The following four principles underpin the requirement that only defendants who 
are competent to do so, should stand trial. 
First, defendants who are forced to stand trial in circumstances where they are not competent 
to do so are deprived of most of their basic constitutional fair trial rights.  These rights, which 
can be traced from the Code of Hummurabi,26 through Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta,27 to the 
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution28 are recognised internationally 
as being fundamental to a fair and legitimate trial.29  As Justice Kennedy emphasised in Riggins 
v Nevada: 
“Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those 
rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the 
right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so 
…”30 
                                                          
26  DINAH SHELTON, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 165 (2013). 
27  TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 10 (Penguin 2010) referring to Magna Carta (1215) chpt 39: “No free 
man shall be arrested or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold or outlawed or banished or in any way ruined, 
nor will we take or order action against him, except by the lawful judgment of his equals and according to 
the law of the land.” 
28  U.S. Const. amend V guarantees in criminal proceedings the right to a jury, forbids “double jeopardy” and 
protects against self-incrimination.  It requires “due process of law” to be part of any proceeding denying a 
citizen “life, liberty or property”.  U.S. Const. amend. VI requires an accused “enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury… to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense”.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV prescribes “due process of 
law” and “equal protection of the laws”.  
29  G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), arts. 7, 8, 10 and 11 and Prot. 
Nos. 11 and 14 European Convention on Human Rights (Nov. 4 1950), art. 6. 
30  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-140 (1992). 
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The key rationale for the competence to stand trial requirement is that it promotes fairness 
for a defendant by protecting their right to defend themselves and ensures that they are not 
inappropriately exposed to the risks of a criminal trial without access to fair trial rights.31 
Second, the integrity and legitimacy of the criminal justice system hinges in part upon holding 
those who have breached criminal laws accountable for their wrongdoing.  In order to hold a 
defendant truly accountable they must understand the reasons why they have been prosecuted, 
convicted and punished.  Absent such understanding, the criminal justice system is merely a 
vehicle to appease the aggrieved rather than to genuinely punish an offender.  This concept also 
underpins decisions of the Supreme Court banning the execution of defendants with profound 
mental illness.32 
Third, allowing the prosecution of an incompetent defendant also undermines society’s interest 
in having a reliable criminal justice system and creates a greater risk of unreliable verdicts.33  
The need for the state to uphold the integrity and legitimacy of the criminal justice system by 
ensuring only competent defendants are tried was emphasised in the following way in United 
States v. Chisholm:34 
                                                          
31  Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 349 (1996):   
“An erroneous determination of competence has dire consequences for a defendant who has already 
demonstrated that he is more likely than not incompetent, threatening the basic fairness of the trial itself.  
A defendant’s inability to communicate effectively with counsel may leave him unable to exercise other 
rights deemed essential to a fair trial-e.g., choosing to plead guilty, waiving his privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination by taking the witness stand, or waiving his rights to a jury trial or to cross-
examine witnesses- and to make a myriad of smaller decisions concerning the course of his defense.  
These risks outweigh the State’s interest in the efficient operation of its criminal justice system…”. 
See also Stephen J. Morse, Involuntary Competence, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 313, 313-328 (2003). 
32  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. (2014); Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. (2017); 
see Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and 
Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOSFSTRA L. REV. 463, 465 (2003): 
“Some nominally responsible actors are not as blameworthy as other offenders, and the criminal law 
formally or informally mitigates the punishment of those with ‘diminished capacity’.  Because the idea 
of deserved punishment emphasizes culpability and blameworthiness, the criminal law confronts the 
special cases of those who are criminally responsible and yet manifestly impaired, mentally ill, or 
developmentally different from competent adult offenders”. 
33  Cooper, 517 U.S. at 367. 
34  United States v. Chisholm, 149 F. 284 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906) at 288. 
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“It would be … a reproach to justice and our institutions, if a human being … were 
compelled to go to trial at a time when he is not sufficiently in possession of his mental 
faculties to enable him to make a rational and proper defense.  The latter would be a 
more grievous error than the former; since in the one case an individual would go 
unwhipped of justice, while in the other the great safeguards which the law adopts in 
the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice would be rudely invaded by the 
tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the law in all its integrity.” 
The reliability of the criminal justice system is founded in part upon the adversarial 
system in which the prosecution and defense are afforded the opportunity to challenge 
the veracity and reliability of opposing evidence, thereby enhancing the reliability of 
the ultimate verdict.  Trying and convicting an incompetent defendant will not however 
serve society’s greater interest in convicting only those who are guilty if the defendant, 
because of their incompetence, is unable to advance an available defense. 
Finally, the American criminal justice system, like that in cognate jurisdictions, is founded upon 
respect for the autonomy and dignity of all participants in a trial.35  A defendant’s right to 
autonomy and self-determination is compromised if they are placed on trial in circumstances 
where they lack the capacity to make trial decisions that are reserved for them and not their 
lawyer.36  Decisions in this category include the defendant’s right to decide how they plead,37 
whether they testify,38 whether to waive trial by jury39 and adduce evidence.40  These rights do 
not really exist if a defendant lacks the capacity to exercise them. 
                                                          
35  R v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (Can.). 
36  Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).  See Stephen J. Morse, 
Mental Disorder and Criminal Law, 101 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 885, 911 (2011): 
“… an incompetent defendant is incapable of exercising the autonomy and self-determination expected 
of criminal defendants who must make crucial decisions”. 
37  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966). 
38  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
39  Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). 
40  Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992).  See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, in which it was emphasised that “The 
right to defend is personal.  The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal 
consequences of a conviction”.  See also Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: the Criminal 
Defendant’s Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147 (2010). 
14 
 
To summarise, underpinning the requirement that only a competent defendant should stand trial 
are the principles that a defendant should be entitled to rights essential to a fair trial; be held 
genuinely accountable for any wrongdoing; be tried in a reliable criminal justice system; and 
be free to exercise their autonomy and dignity as a trial participant.  These governing principles 
are put at risk if the law concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial is not fit for 
purpose. 
A proposed new test 
With these governing principles in mind, Part IV proposes a new test.  The focus of any 
assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand trial should be upon their ability to participate 
effectively in their trial.  The effective participation test is a unitary test that covers all phases 
of a criminal trial and involves a judicial assessment of four functions:41 
Understanding:  this relates to a defendant’s capacity to understand relevant information 
including the charge they are facing, the trial process, the role of participants in the trial, 
evidence, and the purpose and possible outcomes of the trial. 
Evaluation:  this concerns a defendant’s capacity to process information, particularly 
evidence, the case against them, trial directions and to evaluate the impact of that 
information on the defense. 
Decision making:  this concerns the defendant’s capacity to make decisions normally 
required of the defendant during the course of a trial, including how to plead, whether 
to give evidence or put forward a particular defense.  This also concerns the ability of 
an unrepresented defendant to conduct their defense in a way that does not breach their 
fair trial rights. 
Communication:  this concerns a defendant’s capacity to communicate their account of 
their case, and includes their capacity to instruct their lawyer and to give evidence if 
they elect to do so. 
Each of these functions must be able to be carried out rationally, that is to say, in a way that is 
not affected by delusions or other conditions that may impact upon a defendant’s mental 
                                                          
41  Russ Scott, Fitness to Stand Trial in Queensland, 14(2) PSYCH., PSYCHOL. L. 327, 341 (2007). 
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functioning.  Where necessary, these functions must also be able to be carried out in real time, 
particularly where a defendant is required to understand, evaluate, make decisions and 
communicate in response to evidence and issues that arise during the course of their trial.  The 
effective participation test, which owes its origins to jurisprudence developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights involves a judicial assessment of a defendant’s capacity to understand 
and rationally evaluate key information during a criminal trial and then communicate their 
decisions in a rational manner regardless of the causes of any condition that may impact upon 
a defendant’s competence to stand trial. 
Part V of this paper builds upon the conclusions reached in Parts III and IV and examines why 
the effective participation test offers significant advantages over the current federal tests for 
assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Those reasons are linked to the four 
governing principles set out in this introduction. 
State legislation 
This paper focuses upon the federal legislation governing a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial.  It is not feasible to undertake a comprehensive analysis of state legislation governing the 
same topic.  The appendix to this paper contains a summary of the key legislative provisions 
found in each of the states relating to a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  That appendix 
demonstrates that 33 states have provisions similar to 18 U.S.C § 4241 and 12 states have 
legislation that reflects the test set out by the Supreme Court in Dusky.  Thus, while the focus 
of this paper is upon the federal law, many of the conclusions drawn can apply with equal effect 
to those states with provisions similar to 18 U.S.C § 4241 and the Dusky standard. 
16 
 
PART II 
THE CURRENT LAW, HOW IT EVOLVED AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
To understand the deficiencies in the current federal law governing a defendant’s competence 
to stand trial and why reform is desirable, it is helpful to first understand the current law and 
how it evolved.  Learning from our past also assists in deciding what path we should take in 
the future.  Part II of this paper examines the common law origins of the current federal law 
and the development of 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  It also contains an analysis of Dusky and an 
explanation of the key features of the current law and its consequences. 
Early common law 
The common law of the 17th century recognised that: 
“If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense and before his arraignment 
he becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arraigned during such his 
phrenzy, but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed; the reason is, 
because he cannot advisedly plead to the indictment ...”42 
Many of the early leading common law cases concerning a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial involved defendants who were deaf and mute.  In such cases, a jury would be empanelled 
to determine if the defendant was “mute of malice” or mute ex visitatione Dei (by visitation of 
God).  Those adjudged “mute of malice” were subjected to torture in order to force a plea.43  
Those who were found to be mute by visitation of God would have a plea of not guilty entered 
on their behalf on the assumption that was the plea they would have entered if they could have 
done so.  Dyson’s case is an example of an early 19th century case in which the defendant was 
                                                          
42  SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (Sollom Emlyn ed.,  1736).  The first 
publication of HALE’S PLEAS OF THE CROWN was based upon the manuscript left by him at his death in 1676, 
see SIR WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 489-90 (Vol.7., London: Methuen, 1924).  
See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) at 903 (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *24).  The 
word “advisedly” used by Hale and Blackstone was defined at the time to mean “deliberately; purposely; by 
design; prudently”.  Refer “Advisedly”, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (ed., 
Brandi Besalke) http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?p=15235 (last visited July 13, 2017). 
43  MELTON ET AL., supra note 25, at 126. 
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found to be mute by visitation of God.  It became evident during her trial however, that Dyson 
could not understand basic trial procedures, such as how to challenge jurors.  Parke J instructed 
the jury that if they found Dyson lacked “intelligence enough to understand the matter of the 
proceedings against her” due to “the defect of her faculties” then the jury “ought to find her not 
sane”.44  This was the verdict the jury duly returned.  Dyson’s case foreshadowed a distinction 
which emerged in 20th century jurisprudence between factual competence (having the ability 
to plead) and the more refined concept of decisional competence (having the ability to for 
example, give evidence and be cross-examined).  Five years after Dyson’s case Alderson B 
gave his seminal direction in R v. Pritchard,45 which also concerned a deaf and mute defendant 
who was found to be mute “by visitation of God”.  Alderson B instructed the jury to decide 
whether or not the defendant had: 
“… sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to 
make a proper defense – to know that he might challenge any of you to whom he may 
object – and to comprehend the details of the evidence, which in a case of this nature 
must constitute a minute investigation.  Upon this issue … if you think that there is no 
certain mode of communicating the details of the trial to the prisoner, so that he can 
clearly understand them, and be able properly to make his defense to the charge; you 
ought to find that he is not of sane mind.  It is not enough, that he may have a general 
capacity of communicating on ordinary matters.”46 
The test in Pritchard could be distilled to three questions; did the defendant understand the 
nature and object of the proceedings?  Did the defendant understand their relationship to the 
proceedings?  Could the defendant assist in their defense?47 
Alderson B’s directions in Pritchard recognized it was not sufficient for a defendant to simply 
have the capacity to plead.  The common law at the time also required that a trial not continue 
                                                          
44  Esther Dyson’s Case, (1831) 7 Car.&P. 305, 307 (Eng.). 
45  R v. Pritchard, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 135, 7 Car.&P. 303.  Pritchard was ultimately found to be insane and 
he was confined to a prison pursuant to the Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 (UK). 
46  Id. at 304. 
47  P. S. Lindsay, Fitness to Stand Trial in Canada: An Overview in Light of the Recommendations of the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada, 19 CRIM. L.Q. 303, 306–307 (1976-1977). 
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if the defendant lacked the cognitive ability to participate in their trial.  Also significant is how 
the early common law blurred a finding of competence to stand trial with insanity.  As will be 
explained later, vestiges of this aspect of the early common law can still be seen in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4241. 
The Pritchard requirements for being found unfit to stand trial evolved so that today, in many 
common law jurisdictions,48 six criteria are usually referred to when determining whether or 
not a defendant is competent to stand trial.49 
The Pritchard test for competence to stand trial was adopted in 19th century American cases50 
where the Pritchard test was also construed to mean that a defendant lacked the requisite 
competence to stand trial if he or she did not have the intellectual abilities to advance a “rational 
defense”.  The requirement that a defendant have the ability to rationally understand the 
proceedings, confer with counsel and defend themself can be traced to Youtsey v United 
States,51 in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the retrial of a defendant who had 
been found guilty in circumstances where he suffered debilitating epilepsy that rendered him 
“unable to advise his counsel as to his defense”.52  In its opinion, the Court of Appeals explained 
that when issues arose concerning a defendant’s capacity to stand trial, the trial court must 
determine whether or not “the accused [could] make a rational defense”.53  The Court of 
                                                          
48  See, e.g., in the State of Victoria, Australia R v. Presser [1958] V.R. 45 (Austl.). 
49  (1) the ability to plead to the indictment; 
 (2) the ability to understand the course of the proceedings; 
 (3) the ability to instruct a lawyer; 
 (4) the ability to challenge a juror; 
 (5) the ability to understand the evidence; and 
 (6) the ability to give evidence. 
 Refer R v. M (John), [2003] EWCA Crim 3452 (Eng.), 20. 
50  Freeman v. People, 47 Am. Dec. 216 (N.Y. 1847) and State v. Harris, 78 Am. Dec. 272, 272-275 (N.C. 1860). 
51  Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). 
52  Id. at 942. 
53  Id. at 943, citing 2 Bish.Cr.Proc. at § 666; Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 627 (1874); R v Frith, 22 How.Str.Tr. 
307; Reg. v. Berry, 1 Q.B. Div. 447-450; R v. Pritchard, 7 Car.&P. 303. 
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Appeals also said that a trial court should ascertain if the defendant has “the mental capacity 
… to understand the proceedings against him, … rationally advise with his counsel as to his 
defense …” and “rationally defend himself”.54  The reference in Youtsey to a defendant having 
the capacity to “rationally advise with his counsel as to his defense” arguably echoed that part 
of the early common law described by Hale and Blackstone when they spoke of the need for a 
defendant to have the capacity to plead “advisedly” to an indictment.55  The concept of 
rationality also featured in United States v. Chisholm,56 in which the issue as to the defendant’s 
competence to stand trial was left to a jury which was directed to consider whether, he had 
“such possession and control of his mental powers, including the faculty of memory, as [would] 
enable him to testify intelligently and give his counsel all the material facts … and [had] such 
poise of his faculties as [to] enable him to rationally and properly exercise all the rights which 
the law [gave] …”.57  Aspects of the rationality criterion articulated in Youtsey and reaffirmed 
in Chisholm became interwoven into federal jurisprudence and ultimately became embedded 
in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dusky.  As it will be explained in Part III, the rationality 
criterion remains part of the federal law today, albeit in a confused and diluted form. 
18 U.S.C. § 4241 
In 1949 Congress passed An Act To Provide for the Care and Custody of Insane Persons 
Charged with or Convicted of Criminal Offenses Against the United States, and for Other 
Purposes.  That statute was initially incorporated into federal law as 18 U.S.C. § 4244.58  The 
provisions of that Act were amended when Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act 1984 and became incorporated into federal law as 18 U.S.C. § 4241.59  When first enacted, 
                                                          
54  Youtsey, 97 F. at 944, 947.  
55  Besalke, supra note 42. 
56  United States v. Chisholm, 149 F. 284 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906). 
57  Id. at 287. 
58  535, 63 Stat. 686 (1949). 
59  18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006).  Determination of mental competency to stand trial to undergo post-release 
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the federal legislative test referred to a defendant lacking competence to stand trial by reason 
of them being “presently insane or otherwise so mentally incompetent as to be unable to 
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own defense”.  While this 
aspect of the legislation has become more refined, the essential features of the 1949 legislation 
may still be seen in 18 U.S.C. § 4241. 
                                                          
proceedings1 
(a) Motion to determine competency of defendant.--At any time after the commencement of a prosecution 
for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, or at any time after the commencement of 
probation or supervised release and prior to the completion of the sentence, the defendant or the attorney 
for the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant.  
The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering 
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of 
the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense. 
(b) Psychiatric or psychological examination and report.--Prior to the date of the hearing, the court may order 
that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a psychiatric or 
psychological report be filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c). 
(c) Hearing.--The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(d). 
(d) Determination and disposition.--If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally 
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings 
against him or to assist properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of 
the Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable 
facility— 
(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether 
there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit 
the proceedings to go forward; and 
(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until— 
(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a 
substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit 
the proceedings to go forward; or 
(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law; 
whichever is earlier. 
If, at the end of the time period specified, it is determined that the defendant's mental condition has not so 
improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the provisions of 
sections 4246 and 4248. 
(e) Discharge.--When the director of the facility in which a defendant is hospitalized pursuant to subsection 
(d) determines that the defendant has recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand the nature 
and consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense, he shall promptly 
file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. The clerk shall 
send a copy of the certificate to the defendant's counsel and to the attorney for the Government. The court 
shall hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(d), to determine the 
competency of the defendant. If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the defendant has recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense, the court shall order 
his immediate discharge from the facility in which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for trial or 
other proceedings. Upon discharge, the defendant is subject to the provisions of chapters 207 and 227. 
(f) Admissibility of finding of competency.--A finding by the court that the defendant is mentally competent 
to stand trial shall not prejudice the defendant in raising the issue of his insanity as a defense to the 
offense charged, and shall not be admissible as evidence in a trial for the offense charged. 
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The origins of this legislation can be traced to a meeting of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States in September 1942, during which a committee of federal judges was appointed 
to study, in co-operation with the Attorney-General, “The Treatment Accorded by the Federal 
Courts to Insane Persons Charged with Crime”.60  Seven senior judges, including Chief Judge 
Hand, made up the committee that was chaired by Chief Judge Magruder.  The Judicial 
Conference proceeded on the basis that issues concerning a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial should be considered in conjunction with an examination of the way insane persons were 
dealt with in federal courts.  The reasons for this can be traced to an arguable legal lacuna that 
prevented federal authorities detaining criminal defendants who were insane because, 
jurisdiction over such persons was thought to reside exclusively within the parens patriae 
jurisdiction of the states.61  The committee’s final report reflected a degree of merger of the 
treatment of insane defendants and the assessment and disposition of those defendants who 
lack competence to stand trial by reason of mental illness.  The committee deliberated until 
January 1946 when its report and a draft bill was circulated to all federal judges for comment.  
In October 1946 the Judicial Conference adopted with some amendments the draft bill prepared 
by the committee.62  The draft bill was then forwarded to Congress by the Attorney-General 
and passed into law on September 7, 1949. 
The reference in 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to a defendant suffering “from a mental disease or defect ” 
bears some similarity to aspects of the M’Naghten test for insanity.63  That test refers to a 
                                                          
60  HARLAN F. STONE ET AL., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 18-19 (Sept. 1942).  For a 
description of the role of the Judicial Conference of the United States in developing the federal legislation 
see Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1955). 
61  Federal Hospitalization of Insane Defendants Under Section 4246 of the Criminal Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1019, 
1070 (1955); CALVERT MAGRUDER ET AL, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT OF 
COMMITTEE TO STUDY TREATMENT ACCORDED BY FEDERAL COURTS TO INSANE PERSONS CHARGED WITH 
CRIME 9 (1945); Hearing Before the Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S.850, 80th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1945). 
62  FRED M. VINSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 18 (Oct. 
1946), http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/reports-proceedings-1940s (last visited June 13, 2017). 
63  M’Naghten’s case, [1843-60] All Eng. Rep. 229 (HL). 
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defendant not being guilty by reason of insanity if at the time of the alleged offending the 
defendant was suffering “such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing” (emphasis added).  More significantly, the phrase 
“mental disease or defect” in 18 U.S.C. § 4241 replicated that part of the test for insanity 
adopted in New Hampshire in 1870 under which a defendant was not criminally responsible if 
their unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect.64  That test was incorporated 
into federal law by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Durham v 
United States65 (the Durham Rule), but ceased to be part of the federal law following the 
passing of the Insanity Defense Reform Act 1984.  The federal insanity defense now requires 
a defendant relying on the defense of insanity to prove that “at the time of the commission of 
the acts constituting the offense”, the defendant, “as a result of severe mental disease or defect, 
was unable to appreciate the nature or quality of the wrongfulness of his acts.”66  Thus, the 
federal statutory tests for insanity and lack of competence to stand trial are both confined to 
defendants who suffer, albeit to different degrees, a mental disease or defect.  This concurrence 
between the test for insanity and lack of competence to stand trial is a lingering vestige of the 
early 19th century common law under which those who were found incompetent to stand trial 
were deemed to be insane. 
Dusky v United States67 
In 1958 Dusky, who had a history of psychiatric illness, was charged with kidnapping a 15 year 
old girl in Kansas and taking her to Missouri, where she was raped by two of Dusky’s 
accomplices.  Following his arrest he was referred for a mental health evaluation under the 
                                                          
64  State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870) and State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871). 
65  Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
66  18 U.S.C. § 17 (1986). 
67  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 403 (1960). 
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precursor to 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  Dusky, who denied all memory of the events surrounding the 
alleged kidnapping, was found by one psychiatrist to be suffering schizophrenia but 
nevertheless “orientated as to time, place and person”.  A second psychiatrist reported that 
Dusky could not “properly assist” his trial counsel because of his inability to “properly interpret 
the meaning of the things that had happened”.  A third psychiatrist confirmed Dusky suffered 
from schizophrenia.  The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri ruled 
Dusky was competent to stand trial because he was orientated in time and place and because 
he was able to provide some information to his attorney about the kidnapping incident.  Dusky 
was convicted and sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld Dusky’s conviction and sentence.68 
In a three paragraph opinion, the Supreme Court granted Dusky’s petition for certiorari, 
quashed his conviction and remanded his case back to the District Court for a new hearing to 
determine if he was competent to stand trial.69  The brevity of the Court’s opinion renders it 
difficult to extract significant assistance from the Court’s decision.  More assistance can be 
derived from the Solicitor-General’s brief, which the Supreme Court adopted when issuing its 
opinion.   
The Solicitor-General’s brief70 set out his concerns about the equivocal nature of the psychiatric 
evidence relating to Dusky’s competence to stand trial and that the trial court appeared to have 
given insufficient weight to the medical evidence that Dusky was suffering from delusions and 
hallucinations and required tranquilizers during his trial.  The Solicitor-General was also 
                                                          
68  Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959). 
69  Dusky, 362 U.S.  Dusky was again found to be competent to stand trial.  He was convicted following his 
retrial and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment; ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 904 
(Jeffrey S. Kreutzer, John DeLuca & Bruce Caplan eds., 2011). 
70   J. Lee Rankin, Solicitor General, Memorandum for the United States In the Supreme Court of the United 
States, No. 504 Misc; Dusky, 362 U.S., 1-16 (Mar. 1960). 
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concerned that the trial judge had considered it sufficient that Dusky was orientated as to time 
and place and had some recollection of events.  The brief filed by the Solicitor-General records: 
“The test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he [or she] 
has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her].”71 
In its decision the Court agreed in all respects with the position argued for by the Solicitor-
General.  The Court agreed that the record did not sufficiently support the finding that Dusky 
was competent to stand trial and that the trial judge required more information before directing 
that Dusky’s trial continue.  The Court also agreed that it was not sufficient for the trial judge 
to have found that Dusky was “orientated in time and place and had some recollection of 
events”.  Finally, the Court adopted the Solicitor-General’s recommended test (set out in the 
preceding paragraph) for determining whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial. 
Some commentators have suggested that there are just two limbs to the Dusky test, namely, 
“the defendant’s capacity to understand the criminal process as it applies to him or her … and 
the defendant’s ability to function in that process, primarily through consulting with counsel in 
the preparation of a defense”.72  Some other authorities have suggested the Dusky test may have 
three discrete requirements,73 while others have suggested that in its subsequent opinion in 
Drope v Missouri,74 which is briefly examined in the following paragraph, the Supreme Court 
added a further limb to the Dusky test, namely an ability “to assist in preparing [a] defense”.75  
                                                          
71  Rankin, supra note 70, at 11. 
72  MELTON ET AL., supra note 25; Alan R. Felthous, Competence to Stand Trial Should Require Rational 
Understanding, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 19, 19-30 (2011). 
73  RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC PRACTICE: MENTAL HEALTH AND 
CRIMINAL LAW (2006).  Those requirements are that a defendant have: 
(1) sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding; 
(2) a factual understanding of the proceedings; and 
(3) a rational understanding of the proceedings. 
74  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). 
75  United States v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D. La. 2000); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of 
Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 539-601 (1993); AMERICAN BAR 
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The confusion that has prevailed in relation to the federal tests for assessing a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial is further demonstrated by the erroneous suggestion that when 
Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 4241 it “codified” Dusky.76 
In Drope,77 the Court allowed an appeal from the Missouri Court of Appeals,78 which had 
upheld Drope’s conviction for raping his wife.  At issue was whether Drope had been deprived 
of his right to a fair trial when the trial judge declined to conduct a competency hearing prior 
to and during Drope’s trial.  There was, prior to trial, psychiatric evidence that raised questions 
about Drope’s competence to stand trial.  Those issues were compounded when, during the 
course of the trial, Drope attempted to take his own life and was hospitalized for the remaining 
period of his trial.  The Missouri state legislation governing the competence of a defendant to 
stand trial is in all material respects the same as 18 U.S.C. § 4241.79  In delivering the Court’s 
opinion, Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed that in federal cases, the test for determining a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial was that set out by the Court in Dusky.  The Chief Justice 
then paraphrased his understanding of the law in the following way: 
“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks 
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to 
consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a 
trial.” 80 
The Chief Justice’s summary of Dusky made no reference to the “rationality” components of 
the Dusky test.  This was because the Missouri statute that governed Drope’s case, like 18 
U.S.C. § 4241 contains no reference to a defendant having a “rational” understanding of the 
                                                          
ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD (1989). 
76  U.S. v. Renfoe, 825 F.2d 763, 766 (1987); United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
77  Drope, 420 U.S. 
78  Drope v. Missouri 498 S.W. 2d 838 (Mo.Crim.App. 1973). 
79  Mo. Rev. Stat. 552-020(1) (1969) “No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced 
for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures”. 
80  Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. 
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proceedings or to being able to communicate with their counsel with “rational” understanding.  
In effect, what the Chief Justice did in Drope was summarize aspects of the Dusky test and 
simultaneously merge parts of the Dusky test with the legislation governing the assessment of 
a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  It is clear from his opinion in Drope that the Chief 
Justice intended to reaffirm the Dusky test but, in doing so, he failed to refer to the rationality 
components of the Dusky test.  Nevertheless, while the Chief Justice’s opinion in Drope omitted 
an important part of the Dusky test, it did not add in any material way to what the Court had 
said in Dusky. 
The divergences of views in the literature and case law concerning the precise requirements of 
the Dusky test illustrates how much uncertainty has arisen concerning what the Supreme Court 
meant in Dusky.  The following elements may, however, be extracted from the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  First, the test focuses upon the defendant’s “present” abilities thereby drawing a 
temporal distinction between competence to stand trial and the defense of insanity which 
focuses upon the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the alleged offending.  Second, the 
two trial tasks which form the focus of the test are the defendant’s capacity to consult with their 
lawyer and their understanding of the proceedings against them.  Third, the Dusky test concerns 
the defendant’s actual capacity in terms of “ability” and “understanding” and not their 
willingness to participate in the proceedings or communicate with counsel.  Fourth, the Court 
drew an important distinction between a defendant’s factual and their rational understanding 
of the proceeding.  The rationality test requires a qualitative assessment of a defendant’s 
capacity to assist in their defense and have a rational understanding of the proceeding, which 
is discussed further in Pt III.  Under this limb of the Dusky test, a defendant who suffers from 
a mental disorder that affects their ability to perceive reality, may not necessarily be competent 
to stand trial.  The factual understanding requirement on the other hand is a narrower test that 
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involves an assessment of a defendant’s cognitive ability to understand basic issues such as the 
fact that they have been charged and could be punished if convicted.  A defendant with a limited 
factual understanding of the proceedings may not have the ability to appreciate the importance 
of relevant information or be able to evaluate that information and make choices in a rational 
manner.   
The key features and consequences of the current law 
Issues concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial may be raised at any time during the 
criminal trial process, from before a plea is entered through to the time of sentencing.  The 
threshold for initiating an assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand trial is satisfied if 
a bona fide doubt is raised about the defendant’s competence.81  The low threshold for initiating 
a competency hearing is anchored upon the due process provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  There is, however, considerable disconnection between the low procedural 
threshold for conducting an assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand trial and the high 
substantive bar to determining that a defendant is not competent to stand trial. 
A consequence of the way that the Dusky test and 18 U.S.C. § 4241 are framed is that even 
defendants with significant mental illness may be assessed as being competent to stand trial.  
This is because a defendant with a significant mental illness may nevertheless satisfy the 
balance of the criteria for being competent to stand trial set out in the Dusky test and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4241.82  Thus, “not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand 
trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the 
                                                          
81  Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). 
82  Wolf v. United States, 430 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1970); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Myles v. 
Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Leggat, 162 F.3d 237 (3rd Cir. 1998); United States 
v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34 (2nd Cir. 1998); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2000); Moody v. 
Johnson, 139 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994); Oats v. 
Singletary, 141 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 1998); People v. Baugh, 832 N.E. 2d 903 (Ill.App.Ct 2005) and 
Lawrence v. State, 169 S.W. 3d 319 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). 
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charges.  Likewise, neither low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile and 
irrational behaviour can be equated with mental incompetence to stand trial”.83 
The consequences of a finding that a defendant is not competent to stand trial may be very 
profound for the defendant.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) a defendant found to be not competent 
to stand trial is placed in the custody of the Attorney-General and hospitalised “for treatment 
in a suitable facility”.  The defendant may be detained for a “reasonable period” initially, not 
exceeding four months, or “for an additional reasonable period of time”.  The commitment of 
a defendant to the custody of the Attorney-General is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) 
where there is a finding that they are not competent to stand trial.  If, after a reasonable period 
of time the treating facility certifies the defendant has recovered, the court is required to hold 
another hearing to determine if they are competent to stand trial.  If the court holds the 
defendant has recovered it orders the defendant to be discharged from the facility and sets the 
case for trial.  Where a defendant does not recover, or, where they are found to be still 
incompetent, they may be released from the treating facility provided they will not pose a 
substantial risk of causing injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another 
person.84  Where it is established by clear and convincing evidence that releasing the defendant 
found to be incompetent to stand trial will create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
person or serious damage to another’s property then they are held in the custody of the 
Attorney-General.  This requirement must be read in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Jackson v Indiana,85 in which it was held that the indefinite commitment of a 
defendant solely on the basis of their incompetence to stand trial violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that the duration of a defendant’s commitment must bear some relationship 
                                                          
83  Burket, 208 F.3d at 192 citing Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106-1107 (11th Cir. 1995). 
84  United States v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D. La. 2000); 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2007). 
85  Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
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to the purpose for which they are detained.  Treatment facilities are required to treat defendants 
who are incompetent to stand trial with the aim of ensuring they gain sufficient capacity to 
enable the proceeding to continue.86  Restoration programs are primarily housed in both federal 
and state facilities.  However, while state defendants who are incompetent to stand trial are 
waiting for a bed to become available in a state hospital, they may find themselves in a county 
jail receiving inadequate mental health treatment.  In Trueblood v. Washington State it was held 
that detention in a jail is not appropriate for mentally ill detainees who need therapeutic 
evaluation and treatment.87  In Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed the circumstances of individuals who had been found incompetent to stand 
trial and who were awaiting treatment.  The Court held that forcing defendants to wait in jail 
for significant periods violated their due process rights because the nature and duration of their 
incarceration bore no reasonable relationship to the purposes for they were committed.88 
The liberty of defendants found incompetent to stand trial is also adversely affected by 
complexities arising from the intersection of legal and clinical roads when a defendant is placed 
in a treatment facility.  From the legal perspective, the purpose of treatment is to restore a 
“defendant” back to competency.  From a clinical perspective, the rehabilitation of the “patient” 
is the primary focus.  This intersection raises numerous issues which are beyond the scope of 
this paper but have been explored elsewhere.89  One particularly obvious concern however 
arises when a defendant’s liberty is put at risk through the provision of forced medication in 
order to render them competent to stand trial.90  The Supreme Court in Sell v. United States 
                                                          
86  18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006). 
87  Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services, 822 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2016). 
88  Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2014).  
89  See generally Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial From a 
Clinical Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81 (2005). 
90  See generally Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); United States v. Weston, 225 F.3d 873 (DC. Cir. 
2001) and Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
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detailed the circumstances which justify intervention to restore a defendant’s competence 
against their objections.  The Supreme Court concluded that a defendant who is not dangerous 
could be forcibly medicated solely to gain competency to stand trial, provided certain 
conditions, set out in a four-factor test, were met.91  The decision illustrates the tension between 
the government’s interest in creating a defendant competent to stand trial and an individual’s 
interest to refuse medication.92  
A defendant who is not competent to stand trial is faced with significant curtailment of his or 
his liberty.  The consequences of a defendant being found incompetent to stand trial are even 
more significant when one reviews the frequency with which competency findings are made in 
the United States.  Research indicates that approximately 20 to 30% of those defendants who 
undergo a competence assessment are found not to be competent to stand trial.  This equates to 
approximately 15,000 people being found not competent to stand trial each year in the United 
States.93  It is therefore essential that any test for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial ensures accuracy and reflects the principles set out in Part I of this paper which underpin 
the rationale for only prosecuting a defendant when they are competent to stand trial. 
As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, the current federal law concerning the competence 
of a defendant to stand trial was formulated by a Committee of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States in the 1940s as part of its inquiry into how federal courts treat defendants with 
                                                          
91  See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-181.  First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at stake.  
Second, the court must conclude that involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant 
state interests.  Third, the court must conclude that involuntary medication is necessary to further those 
interests.  Fourth, the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate. 
92  See Id.; Forcibly Medicating the Mentally Ill to Stand Trial, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2008) where it 
is argued that “lower courts have adopted weaker protections for the liberty interests of mentally ill 
defendants than what Sell requires”.  See also Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: 
The Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1 (1993) 
where it is argued states have not fully implemented the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson. 
93  Pirelli, et al., supra note 10. 
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mental illness.  The Supreme Court efforts in Dusky to add further substance to the federal law 
created a number of issues concerning the scope of the federal law, and how it can be applied 
in individual cases.  Thus, almost all features of the federal tests for determining a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial were either constructed or adopted by federal judges.  Responsibility 
for deficiencies in the current federal law rests therefore almost entirely upon the shoulders of 
the federal judiciary.  Some of those deficiencies are considered in Part III of this paper. 
PART III 
DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT LAW 
The brevity of the Supreme Court’s opinion meant that the Dusky test failed to address a 
number of issues germain to determining whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial.  
Soon after it was decided, one federal judge bemoaned that the test in Dusky was “… not overly 
helpful in regard to the competency to stand trial question … unhappiness with Dusky is 
produced by the fact that the Supreme Court said so little as to why it held what it did”.94  The 
summation of the Dusky test by the Court in Drope did little to address many of the questions 
left unanswered and the absence of meaningful explanations by the Court about the scope of 
the Dusky test has led to inconsistencies in the way the test has been applied by federal courts. 
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 suffers from having a narrow target, namely defendants who have 
a “mental disease or defect” that renders them “mentally incompetent”.  This test by-passes 
defendants who may lack the competence to stand trial for reasons unrelated to a “mental 
disease or defect”.  The focus of the federal legislation upon defendants with a “mental disease 
or defect” has generated issues concerning the way assessments are undertaken to determine a 
                                                          
94  John W. Oliver, Judicial Hearings to Determine Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 39 F.R.D. 533 (1965). 
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defendant’s competence to stand trial.  It has also led to well-founded and troubling concerns 
that judges may have abdicated their judicial responsibilities in favour of health experts when 
determining whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial. 
The deficiencies in the current federal law governing the competence of a defendant to stand 
trial can be placed into two broad categories namely, jurisprudential and institutional 
shortcomings.  The jurisprudential shortcomings of the current federal tests will be 
demonstrated by examining the limited scope of the current tests, the problems that stem from 
Supreme Court opinions concerning unrepresented defendants whose competence to stand trial 
is in issue and the misunderstandings that have arisen concerning the “rationality” component 
of the Dusky test.  The institutional shortcomings will be examined by explaining the challenges 
posed by clinical methodologies that have been developed by health professionals to assess a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial and, the difficulties faced by lawyers and judges in 
understanding and responding to the current federal tests which have become heavily reliant 
upon clinical opinions. 
Jurisprudential shortcomings 
The narrow focus of the federal tests 
The limited focus of the federal legislation and uncertainties about the extent of the Dusky test 
has led to federal judges responding in ad hoc and at times inconsistent ways when faced with 
a defendant whose competence to stand trial is called into question in circumstances where 
they do not suffer from a mental disease or defect.  The conceptual and practical difficulties in 
the current federal law are illustrated by considering defendants who suffer from personality 
disorders and those who suffer from neurological disorders such as amnesia. 
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Personality disorders 
Those who suffer a personality disorder do not necessarily have a concurrent mental disease or 
defect within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4241, and may therefore not satisfy the statutory 
qualifying criteria for not being competent to stand trial.  At times the boundary between a 
“mental disease or defect” and a personality disorder may be difficult to discern.  The criteria 
for diagnosing a personality disorder are, however, not the same as those that apply to mental 
disease.  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), published by 
the American Psychiatric Association, and the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10), published by the World Health Organisation 
recognise that personality disorders are a form of mental disorder, but are not mental diseases.  
From a medical perspective, a personality disorder may also not necessarily be a “mental 
defect” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4241. 
Personality disorders are described in the DSM-5 as being a class of mental disorder 
“characterized by enduring maladaptive patterns of behavior, cognition and inner experience, 
exhibited across many contexts and deviating markedly from those accepted by the individual’s 
culture”.95  Examples of personality disorders include paranoid, narcissistic and obsessive-
compulsive personality conditions. 
One commentator has recently observed that it is unclear whether personality disorders can 
ever qualify as a mental illness and that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the question have 
held that they do not, but their findings on this issue are muddled or have been limited to the 
diagnosis before them”.96 
                                                          
95  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
646-649 (5th ed. 2013). 
96  E. Lea Johnston, Communication and Competence for Self-Representation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2121, 2160 
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Adding to these definitional difficulties is the reluctance of some judges to place weight on the 
importance of a personality disorder when assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
One reason for that reluctance stems from the overlap between the statutory test for insanity 
and incompetence to stand trial.  As noted in Part II, the term “mental disease or defect” in 18 
U.S.C. § 4241 is linked to the federal standard for insanity that requires the presence of a 
“severe mental disease or defect”.97  That high threshold for absolving a defendant from 
criminal responsibility through the insanity defense has infused the test in 18 U.S.C. § 4241 
for determining whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial.  This in turn has made 
it more challenging for some courts to accept that those who suffer a personality disorder may 
not be competent to stand trial.   
Other factors that have contributed to judicial scepticism about the significance of personality 
disorders include the lack of precision around the diagnostic categorisation of some personality 
disorders;98 the high incidence of personality disorders in some groups in society, including 
defendants in criminal trials;99 and, the difficulty of identifying where, on a continuum of a 
personality disorder, questions about a defendant’s competence to stand trial are triggered.  
Those issues are particularly evident when a defendant’s competence to stand trial is called 
into question by reason of them having a profound personality disorder and in circumstances 
where it is clear they do not suffer from a mental disease or defect. 
It should be noted that, in some cases however, courts have adopted a pragmatic response to 
this issue.  In United States v Veatch,100 for example, the defendant was found to understand 
                                                          
(2015-2016). 
97  18 U.S.C. § 17 (1986). 
98  Thomas A. Widiger & Timothy J. Trull, Plate Techtonics in the Classification of Personality Disorder, 62 
AM. PSYCHOL. 71, 71-83 (2003). 
99  Stephen D. Hart, Commentary: The Forensic Relevance of Personality Disorder, 30 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 510, 510-512 (2012). 
100  United States v. Veatch, 842 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Okla. 1993). 
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what was happening at his trial but, “his severe personality disorder … wrought with paranoid, 
narcissistic and antisocial traits, rendered him incapable of effectively assisting counsel in his 
defense or conducting his own defense”.101  Veatch’s case demonstrated how a significant 
personality disorder can render a defendant incompetent to stand trial and where the Court was 
not willing to give effect to the distinction between personality disorders and mental disease.  
While the approach taken in Veatch achieved a laudable outcome, it required the Court to 
disregard the qualifying criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 4241 which requires Courts to first determine 
if a defendant has a mental disease or defect. 
There are however, other cases in which federal courts have concluded there is both a legal and 
a medical distinction between personality disorders and mental diseases or defects.  In the 
United States v Riggin,102 it was said a “personality disorder is separate and distinct from a 
mental disease or defect”.  Similarly in United States v Diehl Armstrong,103 a federal district 
judge said: 
“There is uncontradicted evidence … that, while [schizophrenia or bipolar disorder] is 
considered a serious “mental disease or defect” for purposes of establishing an 
individual’s mental competence, a personality disorder is not.” 
The same distinction was advanced by the government in United States v Wayt,104 although the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in that case found it unnecessary to analyze the government’s 
submissions when it upheld the federal District Court’s determination that Wayt was competent 
to stand trial.  United States v. McKinney105 further illustrates the distinction which is often 
drawn between personality disorders and “severe mental illness”.106  McKinney, who 
                                                          
101  Id. at 482. 
102  United States v. Riggin, 732 F. Supp. 958, 964 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
103  United States v. Diehl Armstrong, 2008 W.L. 2963056, 26 (W.D. Pa. 2008). 
104  United States v. Wayt, 24 Fed. Apx. 880 (10th Cir. 2001). 
105  United States v. McKinney, 737 F.3d 773 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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represented himself for part of his trial before the federal District Court ordered an assessment 
of his competence to stand trial, was found to have a personality disorder that gave him 
grandiose ideas about his ability to represent himself.  There was, however, no evidence of 
severe mental illness.  In rejecting McKinney’s appeal against the determination that he was 
competent to stand trial, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed 
that McKinney had failed to advance any basis upon which the Court could conclude that a 
“personality disorder can, in a clinical sense, constitute serious mental illness …”.107 
The distinction drawn in these cases between personality disorders and mental disease can be 
contrasted with the approach in United States v De-Shazer,108 in which the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals accepted the defendant’s uncontested argument that there was no distinction in law 
between a personality disorder and a mental disease for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  It 
is questionable what weight should be placed on De-Shazer in view of the fact the point in 
issue was not argued and, in any event, the appeal was decided on the basis that the defendant 
could rationally assist in his defense.  Nevertheless, De-Shazer was followed in United States 
v Mitchell,109 in which a federal district judge had to determine whether the defendant was 
competent to stand trial in relation to charges of kidnapping and unlawful transportation of a 
minor.  Mitchell had extreme religious beliefs, including that he was a prophet who received 
instructions from God to abduct his “followers”.  Two psychiatrists concluded Mitchell 
suffered a narcissistic personality disorder and an anti-social personality disorder.  A third 
psychiatrist concluded Mitchell had a mental illness namely, paranoid schizophrenia.  The 
Court reasoned Mitchell did suffer one or more personality disorders but not a mental disease.  
Applying De-Shazer, the Court said “it [was] not particularly necessary … to determine a 
                                                          
107  McKinney, 737 F.3d at 778. 
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specific diagnosis in determining competency”,110 but that in any event, Mitchell’s personality 
disorder did not render him incompetent to stand trial and even if he had a mental disease or 
defect he was nevertheless competent. 
This sample of cases illustrates the conflicting views between federal courts about the relevance 
of the distinction between personality disorders and mental diseases or defects to an assessment 
under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  This conflict reflects what Professor Johnston describes as “muddled” 
approaches by the courts and a misunderstanding in some cases that there is no meaningful 
distinction between personality disorders and mental diseases or defects.111  This tension in the 
case law also reflects a view that any distinction between these concepts can be obfuscated by 
inquiring into a defendant’s capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the 
proceedings or to assist properly in their defense without determining whether or not the 
defendant has a qualifying condition under 18 U.S.C. § 4241. 
The narrow scope of the current federal tests for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial renders those who have severe personality disorders vulnerable.  Such defendants may 
suffer very debilitating anxiety or other personality disorders that can significantly impact upon 
their ability to understand and evaluate information relevant to their trial and make and 
communicate decisions of the kind normally required of a defendant in a criminal trial.  This 
in turn places at risk the ability of such defendants to receive a fair trial and also risks 
compromising the integrity and accuracy of their trial. 
                                                          
110  Id. at 1193. 
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Amnesia 
Amnesia may be caused by injury, disease or a psychological trauma to the brain.112  Amnesia 
is usually classified as a neurological disorder and thus 18 U.S.C. § 4241 is not engaged in 
cases where a defendant presents with amnesia.  The competence of an amnesic defendant to 
stand trial is therefore determined by applying the Dusky test.  Cases involving defendants with 
amnesia provide a helpful lens through which to examine some of the defects in the Dusky test. 
There are two broad categories of amnesia.  Retrospective amnesia limits the ability of a 
defendant to retrieve information that predates the cause of the amnesia (such as a traumatic 
head injury) while anterograde amnesia affects the sufferer’s ability to transfer new information 
from their active memory to their long-term memory.  Those who suffer anterograde amnesia 
are usually deprived of their memory for long periods of time.  It is very difficult to determine 
the extent to which defendants may be affected by amnesia.  One study suggests that 23% of 
male forensic inpatients charged with serious crimes claim to have been suffering from either 
partial or total amnesia,113 but this figure may not accurately reflect the number of defendants 
who actually do have amnesia. 
Amnesia by itself is unlikely to be sufficient to result in a defendant being found incompetent 
to stand trial.  In Bradley v Preston,114 the federal District Court for the District of Columbia 
held that the defendant’s “persistent amnesic condition” did not negate the clinical evidence 
that he was able to assist in the preparation of his defense and therefore competent to stand 
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trial.  In its decision the Court said “… there is no record of any court holding a defendant 
incompetent to stand trial solely on the basis of amnesia”.115 
Factors that have led to courts being reluctant to recognise amnesia as a basis for finding a 
defendant incompetent to stand trial include “judicial distrust of the authenticity” of claims of 
amnesia116 and the fear that deciding an amnesic defendant is incompetent to stand trial risks 
leaving the determination of criminal liability “… to psychiatrists, whose opinions are usually 
based in large part upon defendants’ self-serving statements”.117  Judicial scepticism about the 
effects of amnesia on a defendant’s competence to stand trial can also be traced to a 
misunderstanding in some judicial quarters about the true nature of amnesia.  It has been 
erroneously suggested by some judges that because most people are forgetful then, everyone is 
amnesic to some degree.118  From a clinical perspective however, there is a vast gap between 
common forgetfulness and amnesia.119 
Dusky himself denied all memory of the events surrounding the alleged kidnapping of the 
complainant and the Supreme Court noted that it was not sufficient for the District Judge to 
have found Dusky “had some recollection of events”.  The focus of the Dusky test is, however, 
not upon the degree to which a defendant can recall events but upon whether he or she has 
“sufficient present ability to consult with [counsel] with a reasonable degree of rational 
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understanding” and a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
[them]”. 
It may be possible to construct an argument that an amnesic defendant lacks a “rational as well 
as factual understanding of the proceedings against [them]”.120  Most authorities however focus 
on the first criteria in the Dusky test and in doing so, courts have tended to adopt a narrow 
approach, by placing emphasis on whether or not the defendant has a “present ability to consult 
with [counsel]”.121  As one commentator has noted the “present ability to consult with counsel” 
test is easily met.  Almost anyone who can actually speak or otherwise communicate will, 
literally, be able to consult with their lawyer.  “This literal reading places the bar so low that 
anyone who can actually discuss trial strategy and choose possible defenses is competent to 
stand trial”.122  This approach undermines the Duksy test by removing an assessment of the 
defendant’s “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [them]”. 
This observation reflects cases such as United States ex re, Parson v. Anderson123 where it was 
said: 
“While amnesia may be relevant as a symptom evidencing a present infirmity in the 
defendant’s reasoning capacity, if the defendant has the present ability to understand 
the proceedings against him, to communicate with his lawyer and generally to conduct 
his defense in a rational manner, memory or want thereof is irrelevant to the issue of 
incompetence.” 
                                                          
120  See Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Fahy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
“complete lack of factual understanding of the period involved in the charges on trial” could result in a 
finding of incompetency). 
121  James E. Tysse, The Right to an 'Imperfect' Trial - Amnesia, Malingering, and Competency to Stand Trial, 
32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 352, 352-361 (2005).  In U.S. v No Runner, 590 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2009) the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a pre-trial ruling that an involuntary manslaughter defendant was 
competent to stand trial, despite unrebutted expert evidence she had post-traumatic amnesic disorder and her 
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122  Tysse, supra note 121, at 365. 
123  United States ex rel Parson v. Anderson, 354 F.Supp. 1060, 1071 (D.Del. 1972).  
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The federal District Court for the District of Delaware held Parson was competent to stand trial 
notwithstanding that amnesia had deprived him of any substantial independent recollection of 
events occurring on the evening of the crime, and notwithstanding he also suffered from 
personality disorders.  By adopting a restrictive approach to the Dusky test when assessing the 
competence of amnesic defendants, such as in Parson, the federal courts have usually found 
that amnesic defendants are competent to stand trial.124   
The narrow approach taken in most federal courts when considering the ability of an amnesic 
defendant to consult with counsel can however be compared with the approach taken by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Wilson v United States.125  The defendant in 
that case was charged with offences arising from a bank robbery.  He was severely injured in a 
car crash while fleeing the scene of the crime and was in a coma for three weeks.  When Wilson 
regained consciousness he had no memory of the events surrounding the robbery.  The 
government conceded at trial that Wilson was suffering permanent retrograde amnesia.  
Following his conviction Wilson appealed.  A majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia remitted the case back to the trial court for a further evaluation as to 
whether or not Wilson’s amnesia had deprived him of his right to a fair trial.  The appellate 
court identified six factors for the trial court to consider when undertaking the reassessment of 
the impact of Wilson’s amnesia on his right to a fair trial.126  Those factors included the strength 
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of the prosecution case, a factor that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also said is 
relevant when determining if an allegedly amnesic defendant was competent to stand trial.127  
This consideration however blurs the underlying purpose of an assessment of a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.  A competence hearing should only be concerned with whether or 
not a defendant is competent to stand trial in order to determine their guilt or innocence.  Those 
who are incompetent, and who are facing a compelling prosecution case, are still incompetent.  
Competence hearings should not be colored by assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the case against the defendant. 
The approach in Wilson in which the Court concluded that an amnesic defendant lacked the 
requisite competence to stand trial has, however, not been widely endorsed by other federal 
courts.  One commentator has stated that Wilson “has almost never been followed”.128 
The preceding discussion of the way the Dusky test has been applied by federal courts when 
deciding whether or not an amnesic defendant is competent to stand trial raises two principal 
concerns with the current law.  First, as demonstrated by Wilson and Parson, there are material 
divergences of view concerning the extent to which amnesia may impact upon the assessment 
of a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  In Parson, the Court proceeded on the basis that 
the defendant’s amnesia had little relevance to the assessment of his competence to stand trial.  
In Wilson, amnesia was regarded as a significant factor that needed to be considered when 
determining whether or not the defendant’s right to a fair trial had been adversely affected.  
Second, the narrow construction of the Dusky test by most federal courts has had the effect of 
diluting that part of the test that requires an evaluation of a defendant’s present ability to consult 
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with counsel “with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” (emphasis added).  This is 
relevant for amnesic defendants who may literally be able to consult with counsel but not to a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding if, they have no memory of the events.129  In 
making this error the courts concerned have failed to appreciate a defendant cannot rationally 
assist in their own defense unless they can advise their counsel of relevant matters in a way 
that is cogent and reasonable.130 
The ad hoc and at times inconsistent ways in which the federal law currently responds to the 
causes of a defendant’s possible incompetence to stand trial leads to the conclusion that the 
focus of any test for determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial should be upon their 
capacity to participate in their trial, and not upon the reasons for a defendant’s incompetence.  
This point can be summarised by asking, “why does it matter that a defendant’s incompetence 
is caused by a mental disease, a personality disorder, a neurological condition or a physical 
condition”?  The answer to that question lies in the realisation that the principles that require 
the society to not prosecute defendants who lack the requisite competence to stand trial are 
engaged whenever a defendant lacks the capacity to effectively participate in their trial, 
regardless of the cause of their incompetence. 
Unrepresented defendants 
The first limb of the Dusky test focuses upon the ability of a defendant “to consult with his 
lawyer” and compliments that part of 18 U.S.C. § 4241 that refers to a defendant being unable 
“to assist properly in his defense” (emphasis added).  Neither the Dusky test nor 18 U.S.C. § 
4241 provide guidance on how a court should determine if an unrepresented defendant is 
competent to stand trial without the assistance of counsel.  This issue has produced vexing 
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decisions from the Supreme Court in Godinez v Moran131 and Indiana v Edwards132 that 
highlight a significant deficiency in the current law. 
The right of a defendant to have an attorney is a comparatively recent development that post-
dates the origins of the common law concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial.133  It 
was in 1932 that the Supreme Court held that a defendant facing a capital charge was entitled 
to counsel under the due process provisions of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.134   
In 1948 the Court recognized that special care may be required before a court allows a 
defendant to represent him or herself in circumstances where their competence to stand trial 
was questionable.  In Wade v Mayo,135 the Court said: 
“There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity are 
incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple 
nature.  This incapacity is purely personal and can be determined only by an 
examination and observation of the individual.  Where such incapacity is present, the 
refusal to appoint counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”136 
A defendant’s right to a state-provided defense attorney was, however, not affirmed by the 
Supreme Court as a constitutional right until two years after Dusky was decided.137  Even more 
recent is a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation.  In Faretta v. California,138 
the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial had the right to decline the 
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services of an appointed attorney and could represent him or herself provided their decision 
was made “voluntarily” and “intelligently”.  The Court said: 
“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the 
accused;  it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.  It is the 
accused, and not counsel, who must be “informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation”, who must be “confronted with the witnesses against him”, and who must 
be accorded “compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour”.  Although not 
stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation – to make 
one’s own defense personally – is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the 
Amendment.  The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers 
the consequences if the defense fails.”139 
The principle underscoring the Court’s decision in Faretta was its desire to uphold the 
defendant’s right to self-determination.  The principles underpinning Faretta can however be 
difficult to apply in cases where a defendant’s competence to stand trial is in issue.  This 
difficulty is illustrated by the Court’s conflicting decisions in Moran and Edwards, where the 
Supreme Court placed different emphasis on a defendant’s rights to self-determination and a 
fair trial. 
Moran140 concerned the standard of competence required for a defendant to validly waive his 
right to counsel and plead guilty.  Moran had shot dead three people in Nevada, including his 
former wife after which, he endeavoured to kill himself.  After he initially pleaded not guilty 
Moran was assessed by two psychiatrists, who concluded he was competent to stand trial.  The 
state then announced its intention to seek the death penalty.  At his next court appearance Moran 
said he wished to dismiss his attorney and plead guilty because he did not want his counsel to 
mount a defense or present any mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial.  
The trial judge granted Moran’s applications after applying Faretta and concluding Moran had 
“knowingly and intelligently” waived his right to counsel and that his guilty pleas were “freely 
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and voluntarily given”.  Moran was sentenced to death, after which he applied to set aside his 
convictions on the grounds that he was not mentally competent to represent himself.  This 
application and Moran’s subsequent appeals were dismissed by the State appellate courts and 
the United States District Court for Nevada.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals however 
allowed Moran’s appeal on the basis that a defendant’s competence to waive their 
constitutional right to an attorney required a higher level of mental functioning than that 
required to stand trial.  The State appealed.  By a 7 to 2 majority the Supreme Court overturned 
the Court of Appeals decision and ruled that the Dusky test for assessing a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial also governed their competence to dispense with their counsel and 
plead guilty. 
In Edwards,141 decided fifteen years later, a majority of the Supreme Court held a defendant 
could be competent to stand trial but not necessarily competent to represent themself in a 
defended hearing.  Edwards, who suffered schizophrenia, shot and wounded a security officer 
when trying to steal a pair of shoes from a department store.  He was initially found to be not 
competent to stand trial.  After a period of treatment in a psychiatric facility it was determined 
Edwards had gained sufficient competence to stand trial.  When his trial commenced, Edwards 
asked to represent himself and for his assigned attorney to be dismissed.  Those applications 
were declined.  Following his conviction, Edwards appealed on the basis that his constitutional 
right to defend himself had been violated.  The Indiana Court of Appeals and Supreme Court 
agreed with Edwards and ordered a new trial.  The State successfully appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which held a state may compel an otherwise competent defendant to be represented by 
counsel when defending a criminal charge.  Justice Breyer, for the majority said: 
                                                          
141  Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
47 
 
“… the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those 
competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental 
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by 
themselves.”142 
The Court in Edwards conferred a discretion upon trial courts to insist upon defendants 
suffering from severe mental illness to be represented by counsel.143  In doing so the Court did 
not enunciate exactly what standard was required for a defendant to defend themself without 
counsel in a contested trial.  Instead, the Court said it was content to leave this issue to trial 
judges whom the Court said “… will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental 
capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant”.144  
The Court acknowledged the similarities between Moran and Edwards.  Both cases involved 
defendants who, notwithstanding their significant mental health difficulties, were found to be 
competent to stand trial under the Dusky standard.  In both cases the defendants wished to 
dispense with their counsel and represent themself. 
One possible route to rationalizing the Court’s decisions in Moran and Edwards is to take the 
view that Edwards is a discrete exception to the Dusky test for determining a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.  The “exception” approach reasons that a defendant in a criminal 
trial may be found competent to stand trial, waive counsel and enter a guilty plea by applying 
the Dusky test but still not be competent to represent themself at a contested trial.145  This 
approach involves a distinction being drawn between a defendant’s competence to dispense 
with their attorney and plead guilty, compared to the more complex and challenging task of 
representing themself in a contested hearing.  This approach also pays deference to the 
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principles of autonomy and self determination evident in Faretta by creating a very narrow 
exception to a defendant’s right to dispense with counsel on the basis that, in the absence of a 
serious mental condition, defendants possess the “right to represent themselves and go down 
in flames if they wished”.146 
The Court’s decision in Edwards has however led to both state147 and federal courts frequently 
trying to manage defendants who represent themselves for reasons that are not objectively 
rational.148  The issues arising from the lack of direction in Edwards are evident the recent 
decision in United States v Roof,149 in which the defendant was diagnosed with autism spectrum 
disorder, attenuated psychosis and potential personality disorders.  He faced the death penalty 
and elected to represent himself in sentencing and present no mitigation witnesses.  The Court 
considered it had no discretion to deny Roof’s constitutional right to self-representation, despite 
his legal strategy being unsound.  The decision re-iterates the high standard in Edwards for 
intervening with a defendant’s decision to dispense with counsel. 
Some scholars have argued that the Court in Edwards was motivated by a fear of the criminal 
justice system being brought into disrepute by the spectacle of incompetent defendants 
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representing themselves at trial.150  This assessment refers to that aspect of Edwards in which 
the Court cited a psychiatrist’s criticism of the current state of the law when he rhetorically 
asked “how in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?”  
Professor Davoli has said it was “startling” that the Court in Edwards acknowledged its 
discomfort with the vision of incompetent defendants representing themselves at trial but chose 
not to address the inherent flaws in Dusky.151 
The unsatisfactory state of this area of the law stems from two troublesome aspects of Moran 
and Edwards.  First, the assessment of a defendant’s competence to dispense with their attorney 
and plead guilty involves the application of the Dusky test that was developed in the context of 
a defendant who was represented during all phases of his trial.  The Court in Dusky did not 
purport to devise a test for assessing the competence of a defendant who wishes to defend 
themself at trial.  Second, in Edwards, the Court recognised the limitations of the Dusky test 
but failed to provide any meaningful guidance on how a trial court should assess a defendant’s 
competence to represent themself in a contested hearing.  The Supreme Court decision in 
Edwards to refrain from providing guidance to assessing a defendant’s competence to represent 
themself has created a lacuna in the current law.  This deficiency can be addressed by revisiting 
the basis upon which a defendant is adjudged competent to stand trial.  As will be explained in 
Parts IV and V of this paper, the effective participation test can satisfactorily fill the gap created 
by the Court in Edwards.  The effective participation test would involve a trial court addressing 
four interrelated questions in relation to a unrepresented defendant.  First, the Court should 
inquire into the defendant’s ability to understand information relevant to the tasks associated 
with representing themself.  Second, an assessment should be made of the defendant’s ability 
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to evaluate what self-representation entails, and the risks associated with a defendant 
representing themself.  The third inquiry involves an assessment of whether or not there is a 
rational basis to the defendant’s decision to represent themself.  Finally, the Court should satisfy 
itself that the defendant has the capacity to communicate in a rational way during their trial. 
Rationality: a misunderstood concept 
In Dusky the Court identified two ways in which a defendant’s rationality is engaged when 
assessing their competence to stand trial.  The Court said that in order to be adjudged competent 
a defendant needs to have the ability to consult with their lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding and have a rational understanding of the proceedings against them.  
The rationality assessment specified by the Court bore close similarity to the approach taken 
in Youtsey in which it was said that in order to be competent a defendant needed to be able to 
“rationally advise with his counsel as to his defense” and “make a rational defense”.152  The 
Supreme Court did not explain in Dusky if it contemplated different levels of rationality when 
it said the need for a defendant to be able to consult with their lawyer with a “reasonable” 
degree of rational understanding but omitted a similar epithet when stating that a defendant 
must also have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against them.  
More significantly, the Court did not explain what test it had in mind when it stipulated the 
need for a defendant to have a rational understanding.  The uncertainty as to what the Court 
intended when it referred to the rationality criterion in the Dusky test has led to both 
jurisprudential and conceptual uncertainties about the rationality requirements in the Dusky 
test. 
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The jurisprudential uncertainties about the rationality criterion in Dusky are illustrated by 
comments of members of the Supreme Court in Moran and Edwards.  To understand those 
comments it is necessary to briefly recall that in Drope the Court applied the Missouri 
legislation which, like 18 U.S.C. § 4241 makes no reference to “rationality”.  Thus, while the 
Court in Drope reaffirmed the Dusky test, the Court’s decision in Drope involved the 
application of the Missouri equivalent of 18 U.S.C. § 4241.  The distinction between the Dusky 
test and the legislative competence test applied by the Court in Drope was subsequently blurred 
by other members of the Supreme Court in Moran and in Edwards.  Writing for the majority in 
Moran, Justice Thomas treated the Dusky test as being identical to the test applied by the Court 
in Drope even though the Court in Drope made no reference to the rationality criterion found 
in Dusky.153  In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy explained the test for competency to 
stand trial was that set out by the Court in Dusky but did not comment on Justice Thomas’ 
merger of the tests articulated in Dusky and Drope.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun 
also failed to draw any distinction between the Dusky and Drope tests.  The merging of the 
Dusky and Drope tests by members of the Court in Moran cast into doubt the significance of 
the rationality component of the Dusky test. 
The doubts created in Moran about the importance of an inquiry into a defendant’s rational 
understanding were further compounded by the opinion of Justice Breyer in Edwards, in which 
he followed the path set by members of the Court in Moran, who had merged the tests set out 
in Dusky and Drope.  After setting out the Dusky test, Justice Breyer proceeded to say: 
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“Drope repeats that standard, stating that it “has long been accepted that a person 
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and 
object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel and to assist in preparing 
his defense may not be subjected to a trial”  (emphasis added).”154 
The merger of the Dusky and the Drope tests by the majorities in Moran and Edwards has had 
the unfortunate effect of diluting the significance of the rationality ingredient of the Dusky test.  
The apparent demise of the rationality inquiry has been lamented by one commentator in the 
following way: 
“The Dusky rationality standard was a progressive step with widespread influence.  
Sadly, its significance is fading, even as the standard itself maintains familiarity.  Its 
important requirement for rationality is slipping into oblivion with nary a word.”155 
The uncertainties in the Court’s decisions about the ongoing role of the rationality component 
of the Dusky test may be explained by the conceptual challenges associated with understanding 
what the Court meant in Dusky when it referred to the need for a defendant to have a “rational 
understanding”. 
In Panetti v. Quarterman,156 Justice Kennedy suggested that “… a concept like rational 
understanding is difficult to define”.157  This remark was made in the context of a challenge to 
the constitutionality of the proposed execution of Panetti by Texas for the murder of his 
parents-in-law.  There was psychiatric evidence that although Panetti understood the State 
intended to execute him for murder, his understanding was based on the delusional belief that 
he was really to be executed in order to prevent him from continuing to preach.  The Court 
accepted Panetti had been denied an adequate opportunity to argue his right not to be subjected 
to cruel and unreasonable punishment.  However, rather than develop a “rule governing all 
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competency [to be executed] determinations”158 the Court remitted Panetti’s case to the trial 
court for further evaluation and assessment. 
Other authorities have suggested that the rationality concept suffers from being vague and an 
absence of consensus as to exactly what it means.159  The requirement that a defendant be 
assessed as having a rational understanding may also risk undermining a defendant’s right to 
self-determination when the assessment is carried out solely on the basis of objective 
considerations.  This concern recognizes a defendant’s understanding may not be considered 
objectively rational but be found to be rational when the subjective context of the defendant’s 
understanding is taken into account. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, it is possible to construct a coherent definition of what is 
entailed by the requirement that a defendant have a rational understanding in order to be 
adjudged competent to stand trial.  That construction draws on the distinction in Dusky between 
a defendant’s factual understanding and the need for them to have a rational understanding, a 
distinction that can be traced back to Dyson’s case in the 19th Century.  The distinction 
acknowledges that it is not sufficient for a defendant to have just a factual understanding of the 
information that underpins their decisions.  Thus, for example, in Panetti, it was not sufficient 
that the defendant knew he was to be executed for murder.  In order for Panetti to have a rational 
understanding as to why the State wished to execute him, his understanding could not be 
affected by pathological delusions such as, the belief that he was to be executed in order to stop 
him preaching.  The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law,160 distinguishes “factual 
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understanding” from “rational understanding” by providing the following two examples.  First, 
a defendant “may have an accurate factual understanding of the legal process as it applies to 
‘ordinary humans’.  Because however he suffers a grandiose religious delusion that no court 
on earth can impose punishment on him, he lacks a rational understanding that if found guilty 
he would be subject to imprisonment”.  Second, a defendant may be able to cite by rote the role 
of his defense counsel but if at the same time he holds the delusional belief that his attorney is 
really an FBI Agent who is working for the prosecution then he lacks a rational understanding 
of the role of his attorney. 
The confusion that has emerged in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence about the meaning and 
significance of the rationality requirements of Dusky should not detract from the importance of 
this element of the current federal tests for determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
It is important however to address any uncertainty about what is meant by a defendant needing 
to have a rational understanding of the proceedings, and to be able to communicate rationally.  
Any reform of the current law should specify that, in order to have a rational understanding 
when making important decisions in relation to their trial, a defendant’s understanding must 
not be affected by delusions or other genuine disorders that adversely affects their ability to 
make decisions that are based upon reality.   
Institutional shortcomings 
Clinical assessments 
The jurisprudential and conceptual weaknesses in the Dusky and federal legislative tests for 
assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial have created a lacuna into which have stepped 
clinicians, researchers and social workers trained in psychiatry and psychology.  While 
decisions concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial are ultimately for a court, judges 
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have become increasingly reliant on evidence from health professionals161 who, in most 
instances are trained either in psychology or psychiatry.162  The intersection of law and health 
sciences in cases concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial is fraught with opportunity 
for misunderstanding and confusion between health professionals, the defendant, their lawyer 
and the judge, due in part because the legislation and legal principles that govern judicial 
decisions concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial have evolved slowly and continue 
to reflect vestiges of the 18th century common law.  Conversely, psychiatrists and psychologists 
provide their evidence from the perspective of mental health disciplines that have developed at 
a pace which vastly exceeds the glacial evolution of the law.  These two disciplines have rapidly 
evolved from forming diagnoses on the basis of subjective assessments of patients to evidence 
based diagnoses using population based data about psychiatric and psychological conditions.163  
A further factor is that there is no direct alignment between the legal construct of competence 
to stand trial and conventional diagnostic categories in psychiatry or psychology.  The language 
of psychiatrists and psychologists on the one hand and that of lawyers and judges on the other 
hand creates significant room for misunderstanding in this context.164  This point was observed 
by the Solicitor General in his brief to the Supreme Court in Dusky when he said “… a court, 
charged by statute with making the determination of whether a man is capable of standing trial 
for a crime … is faced with a difficult task in endeavouring to translate medical terminology 
into legal judgment”.165 
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The challenges created by the extensive reliance that courts now place upon the assessment of 
health assessors when determining whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial, are 
exacerbated by concerns about variations between psychiatrists, psychologists and social 
workers when reporting on a defendant’s competence.  This issue was exposed in a study of 
the assessments of 60 assessors in Virginia and Alabama who had, between them, conducted 
more than 7,000 competency evaluations.  The researchers found a statistically significant 
amount of variance in competence to stand trial evaluations due to differences between 
evaluators.166  The authors also concluded that the evaluator’s professional training was a 
significant predictor of the evaluator’s recommendations with social workers 3.5 times more 
likely than psychologists to find a defendant was incompetent and psychologists 2.04 times 
more likely than psychiatrists to make that same finding.167 
Three broad methodologies are available to clinicians when undertaking an assessment of a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial, namely, a clinical evaluation, the application of 
traditional psychiatric and psychological instruments and the application of competency 
screening instruments.  It is the development of competency screening instruments that has 
proven to be most problematic for judges and lawyers when faced with clinical evidence about 
the competence of a defendant to stand trial.  These challenges are brought into stark relief 
when issues arise concerning the admissibility of evidence derived from the application and 
interpretation of competency screening instruments.  For completeness, a brief explanation will 
first be provided about clinical evaluations and traditional screening instruments before 
focusing upon the legal problems generated by competency screening instruments. 
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Clinical evaluations and traditional screening instruments 
Clinical evaluations are a vital part of a clinician’s inquiry into a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial.  The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law168 has developed a comprehensive 
guideline for clinical evaluations which covers, amongst other topics, the defendant’s 
understanding of the events that led to them being charged and their mental status.169  Although 
not in the form of constructed questions, the guidelines recommend that clinicians 
systematically explore a defendant’s competence related abilities.  The guidelines also 
recognise the importance of collateral information in assisting a clinician when forming their 
opinion about a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Collateral data may be derived from a 
variety of sources, including previous psychiatric or psychological assessments and the 
accounts of family and friends of the defendant concerning their functioning and symptoms.  
The authors of the guidelines recognise the weaknesses inherent in clinical evaluations, namely 
the difficulties in establishing the accuracy and reliability of assessments that are based on 
clinical observations and information that is primarily sourced to the defendant.  The guidelines 
therefore recommend that clinical evaluations be supplemented by traditional assessment 
and/or competency screening instruments.   
There are three traditional assessment instruments that are commonly used in assessing a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.170  Authorities recognise, however, that while 
“traditional assessment instruments can be useful in competency evaluations; … researchers 
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and commentators to date have not adequately addressed when and how they may be used most 
effectively”.171 
Competency screening instruments 
In 1965, Dr A Robey, a forensic psychiatrist developed a checklist for assessing a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.172  Since Dr Robey’s initial checklist was developed, researchers 
have constructed at least 13 competency screening instruments that are used to varying degrees 
to assess a defendant’s competence to stand trial.173 
The Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT) developed in 1988, was seen as an advancement 
on earlier instruments and was described in 2007 by the American Academy of Psychiatry and 
Law as being “one of the more commonly used screening tools for [assessing] competency to 
stand trial”.174  The Academy of Psychiatry and Law described the key weaknesses to the 
GCCT in the following way: 
“The GCCT’s weaknesses include questionable content validity (a full one-third of the 
questions are about the drawing of the courtroom) and lack of meaningful assessment 
of a defendant’s ability to assist his defense”.175 
                                                          
171  Pirelli, et al., supra note 10, at 34-35. 
172  Ames Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 616, 616-623 (1965). 
173  Competency to Stand Trial Screening Test (CST), Lipsett and others (1971). 
Competency to Stand Trial Assessment Instrument (CAI), Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, (1973). 
Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT/GCCT-MSH), Nicholson, Briggs and Robertson (1988). 
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Fitness Interview Test (FIT/FIT-R), Roesch, Zapf, Evers and Webster (1998). 
Competence-Assisted Determination of Competency to Proceed (CADCOMP), Barnard and others (1991). 
Competence Assessment of Standing Trial for Defendants With Mental Retardation (CAST-MR), Everington 
and Luckasson (1992). 
Metropolitan Toronto Forensic Service (MET FORS). 
Fitness Questionnaire (MFQ), Naussbaum, Mamuk, Trembassy, Wright and Callaghan (1998). 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool - Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), Poythress and others 
(1999). 
Evaluation for a Competency to Stand Trial - Revised (ECST-R), Rogers, Tillbrook and Sewel (2003). 
The Test of Malingered Incompetence (TOMI), Colwell and others (2008). 
Inventory of Legal Knowledge (ILK), Musick and Otto (2010). 
174  Mossman, et al., supra note 1, at S41, citing Robert P. Archer, Jacqueline K. Buffington-Vollum, Rebecca 
Vautner Stredny & Richard W. Handel, A Survey of Psychological Test Use Patterns Among Forensic 
Psychologists, 87 J. PERSONALITY ASSESS. 84, 84-94 (2006). 
175  Mossman, et al., supra note 1, at S40. 
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The GCCT was modified in 1992 when the GCCT-MSH was released.  The American Academy 
of Psychiatry and Law warns however, that “users of the GCCT-MSH should … recognize that 
it is focused on factual understanding and offers limited insight into a defendant’s rationality 
or appreciation of his legal situation”.176 
One of the most comprehensive screening instruments is the MacArthur Competence 
Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) that evolved from a broader research 
project into decisional competence.  The MacCAT-CA comprises 22 topics, of which 16 do not 
address the defendant’s actual case.  Instead, the defendant is asked for example to consider a 
hypothetical case about a violent assault between two acquaintances over a game of pool.177  
The American Academy of Psychiatry and Law has explained: 
“Weaknesses of the MacCAT-CA include its limited focus on the complexity of the 
defendant’s case, the defendant’s memory of events, and legal demands such as 
appropriate behavior in court … [I]ts verbal demands may exceed the expressive 
capabilities of mentally retarded defendants who nonetheless understand their charges 
and can converse satisfactorily with counsel.  Evaluees with severe thought disorders, 
memory impairment, or problems with concentration may not be able to complete 
assessments with the instrument”.178 
Another screening instrument, the Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial – Revised (ECST-
R) was first published in 2003179 and was designed to specifically address what the authors say 
are the three limbs of the Dusky test.  The ECST-R has been described as a “potentially 
attractive tool for examiners to use in the assessment” of a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial.180  The same authors however, express concerns about the ECST-R in relation to some of 
                                                          
176  Mossman, et al., supra note 1, at S40-41. 
177  Richard Rogers & Jill Johansson-Love, Evaluating Competency to Stand Trial With Evidence-Based 
Practice, 34(4) J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 450, 450-460 (2009). 
178  Mossman, et al., supra note 1, at S42.  
179  Richard Rogers, Rebecca L. Johnson, Chad E. Tillbrook, Mary A. Martin & Kenneth W. Sewell, Assessing 
Dimensions and Competency to Stand Trial: Construct Validation of the ECST-R Assessment, 10(4) 
SCHOLARWORKS, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSSETTS AMHERST 344-351 (2003). 
180  MELTON ET AL., supra note 25, at 153. 
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the rating scales used in the instrument and the “… internal validity of the scores obtained” that 
“… appear to permit gross incongruencies … between ratings and scale interpretations”.181 
The inherent weaknesses with any competency screening instrument is that there is no objective 
criteria against which to test the validity of the competence screening instrument data because 
it is not possible to clinically assess how a defendant is in fact performing in a trial setting.182  
Thus, while some screening tools may be useful in helping to differentiate between defendants 
who are competent to stand trial and those who are not, commentators acknowledge the 
variability and usefulness of competence screening instruments.183  The deficiencies with 
competency screening instruments identified in the literature by psychiatrists and psychologists 
are compounded when issues arise about the admissibility of evidence derived from the 
application of and interpretation of a screening instrument.  In its opinion in Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals,184 the Supreme Court focused upon the dual indicia of relevance and 
reliability when assessing the admissibility of expert evidence.  It held that, in order to be 
helpful to the trier of fact, there must be a “valid scientific connection” between the proposed 
evidence and the “pertinent inquiry”.  The Court also said that when making a preliminary 
threshold determination as to admissibility, trial judges may consider, amongst other matters, 
whether the technique in issue has been tested, subjected to peer review, published in scientific 
journals, its general level of acceptance and the error rate associated with the technique.  
Subsequently, in General Electric Co v. Joiner,185 the Court explained that trial court rulings 
                                                          
181  Id. at 154. 
182  Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch, Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial in Adults, in FORENSIC 
ASSESSMENTS IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW 24 (Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch eds., 2013). 
183  THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS (2nd ed. 2006); 
MELTON ET AL., supra note 25; Patricia A. Zapf & Jodi L. Viljoen, Issues and Considerations Regarding 
the Use of Assessment Instruments in the Evaluation and Competency to Stand Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
351, 351-367 (2003). 
184  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
185  General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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concerning the admissibility of expert testimony could only be successfully challenged if the 
trial judge had abused their discretion.  One consequence of Joiner is that different trial judges 
may reach conflicting conclusions about the admissibility of clinical evidence based upon the 
application and interpretation of competency screening evaluations without being able to be 
reviewed on appeal.186  The Court’s requirement in Daubert that there be “a valid scientific 
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition” to admitting evidence derived from a 
competency screening test is particularly engaged when clinicians rely on screening 
instruments that do not specifically address either 18 U.S.C. § 4241 or the Dusky test, or which 
are constructed upon hypothetical scenarios that are not connected to the defendant’s 
circumstances.  Thus, legitimate questions may be asked about the relevance of a defendant’s 
responses to questions in the MacCAT-CA instrument about acquaintances fighting over a pool 
game to a case where the defendant is, for example, charged with abducting and raping victims 
and who believes he was commanded by God to carry out his crimes.187 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in State v Griffin188 illustrates the challenges 
presented by the Daubert criteria for the admissibility of expert testimony based upon a 
competence screening instrument.  In that case, the competence of an 18 year old defendant to 
waive his Miranda rights was challenged in proposed testimony from a professor of psychology 
at Yale.  She had used, amongst other methodologies, a competence screening instrument 
devised by Professor Grisso “Evaluating Juvenile Adjudicative Competence”.189  The Supreme 
Court of Connecticut held that the trial court had not misused its discretion when excluding 
any testimony based upon the competence screening instrument devised by Professor Grisso.  
                                                          
186  See Cassandra H. Welch, Flexible Standards, Differential Review: Daubert's Legacy of Confusion, 29 HARV. 
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1085-1105 (2006); ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 73. 
187  See United States v. Mitchell, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (D. Utah. 2010). 
188  State v. Griffin, 869 A.2d 640 (Conn. 2005). 
189  Professor Grisso is a highly renowned psychologist who played a key role in the development of MacCAT-
CA competency assessment instrument. 
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In particular, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s finding that the 
defendant had failed to establish under the Daubert standard that the screening instrument was 
reliable.  This conclusion was based upon the Court’s finding that the defendant had failed to 
establish the screening instrument had been critically evaluated by Professor Grisso’s peers 
and that it was widely accepted. 
Competency screening instruments have been developed by psychiatrists and psychologists to 
provide an evidence-based rationale for a clinician’s opinion concerning a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.  The fact so many competence screening tests have emerged over the 
past four decades underscores the concern that members of the psychiatric and psychological 
communities do not agree as to which type of instrument is most helpful in assessing a 
defendant’s competence.  These uncertainties, when combined with the reported weaknesses 
of a number of the instruments and the challenge for new instruments to pass the Daubert 
standards are factors that suggest judges and lawyers and not psychologists or psychiatrists 
should shoulder the bulk of the weight of any inquiry into a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial.  This conclusion is reinforced when regard is had to concerns about the discrepancies in 
recommendations that have been identified between mental health workers. 
Attorney deficiencies 
Lawyers rarely have the training required to identify in their clients, mental health issues that 
may be subtly masked.  “[A] lawyer is not a trained mental health professional capable of 
accurately assessing the effects of paranoid delusions on the client’s mental processes”190 or 
for that matter, many other mental health conditions. 
                                                          
190  United States v. Salley, 246 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (N.D. Ill. 2003) citing United States v. Timmins, 301 F.3d 
974, 981 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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In addition to lacking the skills to appreciate when clients may not be competent to stand trial, 
defense lawyers are invariably too overwhelmed and under-resourced to give the attention 
required when a client may require a competence assessment.  One commentator has noted 
“the ‘meet ‘em and plead ‘em’ model of representation is common in jurisdictions across the 
United States”.191  Defense lawyers “… cannot interview clients, investigate the facts of the 
case, or file appropriate motions, let alone effectively negotiate plea bargains … Hurried 
conversations in the courtroom itself, or perhaps a hallway or holding cell, are the best that 
most … [defense attorneys] can do”.192 
Attorneys often being unable to identify and assist clients who are not competent to stand trial 
is a tragic reality of the modern American system of criminal trials.  The law reports are replete 
with cases in which defense lawyers have been found to have provided ineffective 
representation in cases where they failed to investigate or present to the court obvious concerns 
about a defendant’s competence to stand trial.193   
Sadly, attorneys are rarely able to fulfil the role envisaged in United States v. Duhon194 in which 
the court, after hearing from medical experts and an independent trial lawyer called as a court 
appointed expert, stated, that a “multi-disciplinary approach is often critical in resolving 
competency issues, particularly, where, as here, the focus is on a defendant’s ability to assist 
counsel”.195    In such a case, “one of the most evident issues is whether the assessing 
                                                          
191  Lisa Kern Griffin, State Incentives, Plea Bargaining Regulation, and the Failed Market for Indigent Defense, 
80 Law and Contemporary Problems 83, 94 (2017). 
192  Griffin, supra note 191, at 95 citing Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender.  It’s impossible for me to do a good 
job representing my clients, Wash. Post (Sept. 3, 2015). 
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Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Becton v. Barnett, 920 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1990); United 
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328 (D.C. 2013); Matthews v. State, 358 S.C. 456, 596 S.E. 2d 49 (2004); Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 
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194  United States v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663 (W.D. La. 2000). 
195  Id. at 669. 
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professional, usually a psychiatrist or a psychologist, really knows what would normally go 
into the defense of the case”.196  The Court appreciated in Duhon that medical assessors may 
not be ideally placed to assess whether or not a defendant is able to genuinely assist their 
counsel in preparing the defense case because a psychiatrist or psychologist may not really 
know from a defense attorney’s perspective what is required from a defendant to defend 
charges.197 
While the practical challenges faced by defense attorneys for assessing a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial are unlikely to be addressed in the immediate future, a new formula 
would more likely achieve the multi-disciplinary approach that appealed to the Court in Duhon, 
which recognized the important role that lawyers can and should play in assisting the Court to 
determine whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial. 
Judicial deficiencies 
Clinicians now occupy a pivotal role in the assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial.198  The reasons for this state of affairs can be distilled to three factors. 
First, judges, like attorneys are unlikely to have the technical knowledge required to question 
and challenge assessments made by psychiatrists and psychologists concerning a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.  Thus, while ultimately the decision as to whether or not a defendant 
                                                          
196  Id. at 669, citing Michael N. Burt and John T. Philipsborn, Assessment of Client Competence, A Suggested 
Approach, CHAMPION, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS (June 
1988). 
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Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant, 58 AM.U.L. REV. 207 (2008); Sarah Hur, An Attorney’s Dilemma: 
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is competent to stand trial is within the exclusive domain of the judge, in reality, there is a high 
degree of judicial adoption of the views put forward by clinicians.199  As noted by Judge H 
Edwards, “the judicial system is encumbered by judges … who generally lack the scientific 
expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner”.200  
The deficiencies in judicial training and knowledge are very evident in cases where judges 
routinely rely without question, upon the evidence of mental health professionals when 
deciding whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial.  Second, the adversarial process 
of a criminal trial is not an optimum forum for testing complex scientific evidence about a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.  The adversarial model is predicated on the basis that a 
criminal trial is “a dispute between two sides in a position of theoretical equality before a court 
which must decide on the outcome of the contest”.201  This theory does not reflect the reality 
of most prosecutions today in which the defense attorney is more likely to direct their limited 
resources towards achieving a resolution through a plea bargain, rather than embark on the time 
consuming, challenging and potentially expensive task of testing the prosecution’s arguments 
concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Third, the judicial system involves a “case 
by case” adjudicatory approach202 which does not align with the training of psychologists and 
psychiatrists who, in the pursuit of evidence-based methodologies, apply to individual cases, 
data developed from groups.203  The mismatch between the case by case route that judges are 
trained to follow and the broader group databases from which clinicians draw conclusions is 
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(2006). 
66 
 
particularly problematic in cases where mental health experts rely upon competency 
assessment instruments that do not address the unique circumstances of each defendant. 
Research confirms that judges have developed a high level of dependence upon the views of 
psychiatrists and psychologists concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  In one 
study, which focused upon a cohort of 328 competency determinations in state courts in 
Alabama, where the statutory test for determining competency to stand trial replicates the 
Dusky test, researchers found that in all but one case the courts accepted the recommendations 
of the mental health professionals concerning the competence of the defendant to stand trial.204  
In the Alabama study, researchers questioned judges in order to try and understand the high 
rate of agreement between judicial determinations concerning a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial and the clinician’s report.  The judges who were interviewed all indicated their belief 
that mental health professionals are more qualified to determine if a defendant is competent to 
stand trial than judges or lawyers.  One judge in particular expressed his frustration with clinical 
reports that did not answer the ultimate question concerning a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial.  He said his job would be “much easier” if the mental health professional would “simply 
state whether the defendant was competent or not”.205  Caution must be exercised before 
extrapolating studies of state courts’ practices into the federal setting.  The Alabama study is, 
however, generally consistent with other studies which have found that judges have tended to 
accept the recommendations of health professionals concerning the competence of a defendant 
to stand trial in at least 90% of cases.206 
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The heavy dependence which judges place upon clinicians’ opinions when determining a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial leads to three adverse consequences.  First, the tendency 
of judges to systematically accept the recommendations of clinicians may lead to judges and 
lawyers bypassing making their own appropriate inquiries into a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial.  This concern has led to one commentator lamenting that “decision-making in this 
area is effectively delegated to clinical evaluators making low visibility, unreviewable 
decisions pursuant to a vague open texted [clinical] standard”.207  Second, if judges simply 
follow recommendations made by clinicians, they risk not properly testing those 
recommendations.  It is entirely appropriate that the opinions of clinicians be tested by judges 
through their own observations, and that the subtleties of any competing contentions from 
health professionals be weighed in the judge’s overall assessment of a defendant’s competence 
to stand trial.  Third, if, as some commentators have suggested, judges are abdicating 
responsibility for determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial in favour of clinicians208 
then serious questions arise about how effectively judges are preserving the fair trial rights of 
defendants whose competence to stand trial is in issue.  The fundamental integrity and 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, and society’s interest in having a reliable criminal 
justice system is also placed at risk if judges fail to independently inquire into and assess the 
competence of a defendant to stand trial. 
The deficiencies in the current federal law for determining a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial justify the adoption of a more appropriate test for addressing this vital aspect of the 
criminal law.  That new approach should strive to overcome the limitations of the existing law 
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by providing a comprehensive test for determining a defendant’s competence that places 
lawyers and judges, not clinicians, at the center of the inquiry. 
PART IV 
A MORE APPROPRIATE TEST FOR ASSESSING COMPETENCE 
The current federal tests governing the competence of a defendant to stand trial are antiquated, 
deficient and no longer fit for purpose.  Other comparable jurisdictions have adopted or are 
considering adopting the effective participation test for assessing a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial.  Part IV of this paper contains an explanation of the provenance of the effective 
participation test, what it entails and explores the reasons why the effective participation test is 
superior to the current federal law for determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial. 
Provenance of the effective participation test 
The origins of the effective participation test can be traced to the minimum fair trial rights in 
art 6(3) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (the European Convention).  While art 6(3) of the European Convention does not 
expressly refer to a defendant’s right to effective participation in his or her trial, the European 
Court of Human Rights has said that the effective participation standard is an overarching trial 
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right that encompasses the enumerated rights set out in art 6(3).209  Thus, in Stanford v United 
Kingdom,210 the European Court of Human Rights said: 
“Article 6 … read as a whole, guarantees the right of an accused to participate 
effectively in a criminal trial.  In general this includes, inter alia, not only his right to 
be present, but also to hear and follow the proceedings.  Such rights are implicit in the 
very notion of an adversarial procedure and can also be derived from the guarantees 
contained in … Article [6(3)] … ‘to defend himself in person’, ‘to examine or have 
examined witnesses’, and ‘to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in court’.”211 
In S.C. v. United Kingdom,212 the European Court of Human Rights expanded upon the meaning 
of the effective participation test when it said: 
“‘[E]ffective participation’” in this context presupposes that the accused has a broad 
understanding of the nature of the trial process and what is at stake for him or her, 
including the significance of any penalty which may be imposed.  It means that he or 
she, if necessary with the assistance of, for example, an interpreter, lawyer, social 
worker or friend, should be able to understand the general thrust of what is said in court.  
The defendant should be able to follow what is said by the prosecution witnesses and, 
if represented, to explain to his own lawyers his version of events, point out any 
statements with which he disagrees and make them aware of any facts which should be 
put forward in his defense.”213 
The effective participation test has been adopted by the Appellate Chamber of the 
International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia.214  That tribunal reviewed the 
competence to stand trial test previously adopted by another international criminal 
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tribunal that had favored an adaptation of the Dusky standard.215  The Appellate 
Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia decided not 
to follow the Dusky approach and opted instead for the effective participation test.   
The basic elements of the effective participation test as developed by the European 
Court of Human Rights, for determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial have 
been endorsed by the Law Commission of England and Wales.216  In its 2016 report, the 
Law Commission recommends replacing the common law test for competence to stand 
trial with a statutory test that focuses upon a defendant’s ability to effectively participate 
in their trial.  The effective participation test has also been accepted in Scotland after 
the Scottish Law Commission recommended Scotland follow the European Court of 
Justices’ approach to assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial.217 
The effective participation test: what it entails 
Three broad questions are addressed when describing what the effective participation test 
entails; namely, what matters must the defendant understand in order to be assessed as 
competent to stand trial under the effective participation test?  What level of understanding 
must the defendant possess?  How is the effective participation test applied? 
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The matters that a defendant must understand under the effective participation test 
Nine trial tasks can be extracted from the literature and judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights as being matters that should be inquired into when deciding whether or not a 
defendant is competent to stand trial under an effective participation test.218 
The defendant must understand the charges they are facing.  In order to satisfy this 
requirement the defendant must understand more than just the details of the charge.  
What is required is that the defendant understand in general terms how the prosecution 
says the charge will be proven against them. 
When deciding how to plead, the defendant must be able to evaluate the significance of 
entering a plea of guilty or not guilty and what consequences will flow from whichever 
plea is entered.  The defendant must be able to decide how to plead and to do so 
rationally. 
If a plea of not guilty is to be entered, and if it is permissible for the charges to be heard 
by a judge sitting without a jury then, the defendant must understand the significance 
of opting for a trial before a judge and jury or without a jury, evaluate relevant 
considerations and communicate his or her decision rationally. 
The defendant should have the ability to understand the process of challenging jurors 
for cause or peremptorily, evaluate relevant factors and decide rationally whether or not 
to challenge a juror.  The defendant must also be able to provide instructions to counsel 
in relation to jury challenges or, if they are representing themself, the defendant must 
have the ability to challenge jurors on a rational and informed basis. 
The defendant must have the ability to follow the proceeding.  This includes 
understanding essential points made by witnesses in order to understand the case 
against them, evaluate evidence and trial rulings, decide how to advance their own 
defense either in person or through counsel and communicate their decisions in a 
rational manner. 
The defendant must understand what is at stake in their trial.  This criterion includes a 
requirement that the defendant understand the significance of any conviction and any 
sentence that may be imposed.  This requirement is different from the need for a 
defendant to understand the charges that they are facing as it necessitates that they 
understand the purpose of the trial, what the potential outcomes are and how those 
consequences may affect them. 
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The defendant must have the ability to instruct his or her counsel with sufficient 
rationality so as to enable their lawyer to understand and advance the defendant’s 
account of events and challenge those parts of the prosecution case that are in issue. 
If representing themself, a defendant must have the ability to conduct their own case in 
a way that does not breach their right to a fair trial.  This can be a particularly 
challenging consideration, especially in cases when the defendant’s delusional beliefs 
cause them to dispense with the services of an attorney. 
If the defendant elects to give evidence they must understand the significance of that 
decision.  It is crucial that if a defendant gives evidence they genuinely understand 
questions put to them and have the capacity to provide answers in a rational way. 
These nine trial tasks that underpin the effective participation test demonstrate that the test 
extends beyond a defendant’s capacity to consult with their lawyer and their capacity to 
understand the proceedings against them.  The effective participation test encompasses all 
aspects of the defendant’s trial and the decisions that they may be required to make at all stages 
of their criminal trial, from the time they are required to plead through to sentencing.  On 
occasions giving effect to the effective participation test requires the defendant having the 
services of a suitably qualified person to assist them in understanding information and in 
communicating their decision.  It may also be necessary in some cases for the Court to facilitate 
the defendant’s effective participation by providing the defendant with sufficient time to be 
able to carry out these functions during their trial.  This may be achieved by frequent recesses 
and by the Court engaging the services of a professional evaluator to monitor the defendant’s 
engagement and responsiveness during the trial. 
What level of understanding does the effective participation test entail? 
In its reports advocating an effective participation test in England and Wales, the Law 
Commission suggests a defendant’s competence to stand trial should focus upon their decision-
making capacity.219  The authors of the Law Commission report recommended in their 
                                                          
219  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 216, at 1.46. 
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consultation paper that the assessment of a defendant’s capacity to stand trial involves an 
examination of their ability “to make a particular decision in relation to a particular set of 
circumstances”.220  Although some commentators have suggested that a capacity-based test is 
less “abstract” than tests that focus upon a defendant’s cognitive abilities,221 the Law 
Commission did not suggest the complete abandonment of an assessment of a defendant’s 
cognitive abilities.  Instead, it recommended that in addition to assessing a defendant’s 
cognitive capabilities, the effective participation test should also incorporate an assessment of 
a defendant’s reasoning deficiencies.222   
Less straightforward is whether or not the current requirement of rational understanding set out 
in the Dusky test should be retained if the Supreme Court were to mould the Dusky test into an 
effective participation test.  In its consultation paper, the Law Commission of England and 
Wales suggested that “rationality” is a concept that suffers from being vague and that it is not 
universally understood.223  The Law Commission argued that requiring a defendant have a 
rational understanding in order to be competent to stand trial risks undermining their autonomy 
simply because their understanding may not be rational when judged objectively.224  The Law 
Commission considered there should not be a “blanket requirement” that a defendant’s 
understanding be rational in order for them to be adjudged competent to stand trial.225  The 
approach of the Law Commission for England and Wales in relation to “rationality” can be 
compared to that taken in South Australia where the statutory test for assessing a defendant’s 
                                                          
220  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 159, (C.P.197, 2010) at 2.73. 
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competence to stand trial requires an assessment of the defendant’s ability “to understand, or 
respond rationally to, the charge or the allegations …”.226 
The apprehensions expressed by the Law Commission of England and Wales concerning the 
need for a rationality component in an effective participation test appears in part to be based 
upon a misapprehension that rationality equates with a defendant acting in their best interests.  
These two concepts should not be conflated.  In the context of being able to effectively 
participate in their trial, the requirement that a defendant be able to rationally understand and 
evaluate relevant information and communicate in a rational way means that when judged 
objectively, their capacity to understand, evaluate, make decisions, and communicate are 
unaffected by delusions or other conditions that may affect the defendant’s perceptions.  This 
requirement ensures the defendant is genuinely receiving the benefit of their rights to a fair trial 
and is able to exercise their autonomy in a way that enhances the accuracy and dignity of the 
criminal justice system. 
In addition, uncertainties in English jurisprudence about what is meant by a defendant having 
a rational understanding do not translate with any degree of synergy into American experiences 
where rationality has been part of the federal law governing competence to stand trial since 
Youtsey’s case was decided in the late 20th century.  The United States has also had the further 
advantage of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Panetti that in order for a defendant to have a 
rational understanding, their understanding must not be influenced by psychotic delusions. 
                                                          
226  Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) 269(H) (Austl.); see also LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF 
CANADA, CRIMINAL PROCESS AND MENTAL DISORDER, Working Paper 14, Ottawa, 31-44 (1975), in which 
it was recorded that “Instructing counsel is tied to the accused’s participation at trial and implies the ability 
to communicate rationally” (at 36).  The New South Wales Law Reform Commission also recommended 
that the test for unfitness to stand trial should include reference to a defendant’s ability to use information as 
part of a “rational decision-making process” in NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PEOPLE 
WITH COGNITIVE AND MENTAL HEALTH IMPAIRMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONSEQUENCES, Report No. 138, 31-50 (2013) (at 37). 
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The importance of retaining the rationality understanding criterion when assessing a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial is illustrated by United States v. Timmins,227 in which the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit quashed the defendant’s conviction on the basis that the 
trial court had not properly considered the rationality requirements of the Dusky test.  The 
evidence before the trial judge from two psychiatrists was that Timmins had “‘persecutory and 
grandiose delusional beliefs’, including the perception that he was being harassed by police 
because they were jealous of him”.228  One psychiatrist however, minimised the importance of 
Timmins’ irrational beliefs by saying the preponderance of the evidence suggested Timmins 
was competent although “there [was] room for disagreement”.229  Even though there was 
persuasive evidence Timmins did not understand the significance of a plea offer from the 
prosecution, the trial judge found Timmins was competent to stand trial because his counsel 
believed he was “able to aid and assist in his defense”.230  The Court of Appeals rejected the 
approach taken by the trial judge because Timmins’ lack of understanding about the 
significance of the plea bargain offer meant he could not rationally assist in his defense.  Absent 
a requirement that Timmins have a rational understanding, his conviction would, in all 
likelihood, have been affirmed notwithstanding that his delusional and persecutory beliefs 
significantly affected his ability to genuinely understand key features of his trial.231  Timmins 
illustrates why the rationality component in Dusky should be an essential feature of the effective 
participation test. 
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How is the effective participation test applied? 
An effective participation test requires that a judge’s assessment as to whether or not a 
defendant is competent to stand trial be informed by relevant clinical evidence.  This evidence 
would continue to be mainly provided by psychiatrists and psychologists, who would be 
expected to provide the Court with evidence about the defendant’s cognitive abilities and their 
capacity to rationally understand and evaluate relevant information and make and communicate 
their decisions in a rational manner.  The psychiatrist or psychologist should provide evidence 
about any psychiatric or psychological disorder that the defendant suffers from, however 
identification of a mental disease or defect should not be determinative of a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.   
Lawyers would also be expected to play a significant role in assisting the Court in deciding 
whether or not a defendant was competent to stand trial through being able to effectively 
participate in his or her trial, particularly where the inquiry is into a defendant’s ability to assist 
his or her counsel.  In this respect, the overriding responsibility of a defense attorney is to 
discharge his or her duty as an officer of the Court by communicating to the Court freely and 
frankly any concerns they harbor about their client’s competence to stand trial.  Such 
communications must not be encumbered by concerns about client confidentiality or 
instructions from the defendant not to challenge his or her competence to stand trial.  As Chief 
Justice Burger said in Nix v. Whiteside,232 while the lawyers “overarching duty” is to advocate 
and advance a client’s interests and instructions, that duty is limited by the lawyers “equally 
solemn” responsibility and duties as an officer of the Court.233  The responsibilities of a defense 
                                                          
232  Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
233  Id. at 166-168.  See also American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Standards: for the Defense Function 
(4th ed. 2015), 4-5.2 (c) which states: 
 “If defense counsel has a good faith doubt regarding the client’s competence to make important 
decisions, counsel should consider seeking an expert evaluation from a mental health professional, 
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attorney, as an officer of the Court, are particularly important in cases where a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial is questionable and where the defendant instructs their attorney they 
do not want to challenge their competence to stand trial.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
has said that “if defense counsel suspects that the defendant is unable to consult with him ‘with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ … he cannot blindly accept his client’s demand 
that his competence not be challenged.”234  Other courts have also found that an attorney who 
fails in the face of credible evidence to investigate a defendant’s competence to stand trial risks 
a finding that the attorney has provided ineffective assistance to his or her client.235  
Recognizing the significant role of a defense attorney in assessing a defendant’s competence 
to stand trial reflects the approach taken in Duhon, in which the Court emphasized the value of 
a “multi-disciplinary approach” towards assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial.236   
As the Court suggested in Duhon, it is the defense lawyer and not a psychiatrist or psychologist 
who may be best positioned to assess their client’s ability to advance their defense. 
The trial judge must be given every reasonable opportunity to form his or her own view about 
the defendant’s capacity to “effectively participate” in their trial.  The very nature of the 
effective participation test re-asserts the judge’s crucial position in making these assessments.  
This may require a competency assessment hearing in the nature of a voir dire in which the 
defendant is required to give evidence relevant to their capacity to effectively participate in 
their trial.  Such a hearing may be particularly useful where it is submitted prior to trial the 
defendant needs to be able to give evidence in order to advance their defense but lacks the 
                                                          
within the protection of confidentiality and privilege rules if applicable”.  
234  Bundy v. Dugger, 816 F.2d 564, 566 (11th Cir. 1987), citing Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 
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capacity to do so.  Such a hearing would need to be carefully controlled by the trial judge so as 
to ensure the defendant’s right not to incriminate themself is respected. 
This process may add to the time and costs associated with conducting a trial.  For many this 
will be an unattractive proposition in the context of what is already an over burdened and under-
resourced process.  Nevertheless, concerns about costs and resources cannot be permitted to 
deflect from the ultimate goals of ensuring a defendant receives a fair trial, that the integrity, 
legitimacy and accuracy of the criminal justice system is not undermined and that the autonomy 
and dignity of defendants is preserved. 
PART V 
WHY THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION TEST SHOULD BE ADOPTED 
Advantages to the effective participation test 
In order for the thesis in this paper to gain traction it is necessary to demonstrate the effective 
participation test offers advantages over the current federal law governing the determination of 
whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial.  That will be done by explaining how 
the effective participation test successfully addresses the key criticisms of the current federal 
law set out in Part III of this paper.  The explanation of the advantages of the effective 
participation test over the current federal law will be undertaken by examining both the 
conceptual and practical advantages of the effective participation test. 
There are three key advantages to the effective participation test.  First, the cause of a 
defendant’s incompetence becomes a peripheral consideration under the effective participation 
test.  Second, the effective participation test provides one test for all contexts.  Third, judicial 
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responsibilities are returned to the forefront of the inquiry into a whether or not a defendant is 
incompetent to stand trial. 
The peripheral relevance of the cause of a defendant’s incompetence 
As explained in Part III, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 is confined to defendants who suffer a “mental 
disease or defect”, and, although the Dusky test has a wider ambit, it was also decided in the 
context of a defendant who had been found to be suffering a psychiatric illness.  The federal 
laws were developed against the backdrop of judges and legislators wishing to ensure that a 
finding that a defendant lacks competence to stand trial was reserved for cases where the cause 
of a defendant’s incompetence was clearly established.  Thus, a hallmark of federal 
jurisprudence in cases concerning a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial has been the 
suspicion that applications to assess a defendant’s competence to stand trial may be motivated 
by a defendant’s desire to avoid accountability for criminal wrongdoing, rather than by a 
genuine concern about a defendant’s competence.  This in turn has placed a high onus on those 
who wish to challenge on appeal decisions made by trial judges not to inquire into a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial.237 
As Part III of this paper demonstrates, any genuine inquiry into a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial should not be restricted by the “causes” of his or her incompetence but rather into 
the “effect” of the defendant’s condition.  In other words, the inquiry should be whether a 
defendant can effectively participate in his or her trial. 
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The case of Hernandez v. Ylst238 illustrates the reluctance of appellate courts to critically 
question a trial court’s decision not to inquire into a defendant’s competence to stand trial in 
circumstances where the defendant was sane but suffering significant psychological disorders.  
Hernandez was convicted of shooting a man who, “at least in Hernandez’s mind, was having 
an affair with Hernandez’s wife”.239  Prior to his trial Hernandez made “bizarre” and 
“delusional” statements that prison officers were injecting him with heroin through birth marks 
and moles on his skin and that he had been raped by prison guards while he was drugged.  A 
psychologist assessed Hernandez before trial and concluded he suffered delusions and 
depression and that his condition “would have prevented him from appreciating the criminality 
of his alleged misconduct”.240  Neither the defense counsel or trial judge initiated a competency 
assessment.  Instead, during the course of his trial Hernandez changed his plea to “not guilty 
by reason of insanity”.  Three psychiatrists then examined Hernandez and concluded he was 
sane at the time of his alleged offending.  No consideration appears to have been given however 
to conducting an assessment of Hernandez’s competence to continue to stand trial.  Ultimately, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded Hernandez’s right to a fair trial had not been 
breached because “the record … contain[ed] no indication that the trial judge ever harbored 
any doubts as to Hernandez’s competence to stand trial”.241  The unchallenged psychological 
evidence demonstrated however Hernandez suffered a significant psychological condition and 
that his delusions and depression prevented him from understanding the nature and significance 
of the allegations against him.  The focus of the trial was upon whether or not Hernandez was 
insane at the time of his alleged offending rather than whether the psychological evidence 
demonstrated he lacked competence to stand trial.  This error was compounded by the appellate 
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239  Id. at 715. 
240  Id. at 718. 
241  Id. at 721. 
81 
 
court which noted the psychologist’s assessment but explained he had not specifically opined 
on Hernandez’s competence to stand trial.  This was not a valid criticism given the clarity of 
the psychologist’s finding and because it was for the trial judge, not the psychologist to 
determine the ultimate question concerning Hernandez’s competence to stand trial.  
In Hernandez’s case the focus of inquiries during his trial was on whether or not Hernandez 
suffered a disease or defect of the mind.  The evidence concerning his psychological illness 
was therefore not properly evaluated by the trial judge thereby allowing the cause of 
Hernandez’s mental issues to assume center stage.  The causes of a defendant’s possible 
incompetence, however, should only be of peripheral relevance.  The fact a defendant suffers 
a condition that may impact upon their competence to stand trial may trigger an inquiry into 
their competence.  The focus of an inquiry should not however be upon the causes of a 
defendant’s possible incompetence but whether or not they actually lack the requisite 
competence to stand trial. 
Hernandez, alongside defendants who suffer from, for example, personality disorders or 
neurological conditions, or any defendant who fails to meet the narrow criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 
4241 and Dusky, would be better assessed through the lens of the effective participation test.  
A key advantage of the effective participation test is that it is unencumbered by the current 
legislative criterion that requires a defendant to be demonstrably suffering a “mental disease or 
defect” or the uncertainty in some circles about whether or not a personality disorder or other 
condition is sufficient to lay the foundation for a finding that a defendant is not competent to 
stand trial.  By focusing on a defendant’s competence to understand, evaluate, decide and 
communicate in relation to key trial issues, the effective participation test ensures the causes 
of a defendant’s possible incompetence are of secondary relevance.  Had the focus in 
Hernandez’s case been on whether or not he possessed the capacity to understand, evaluate and 
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make key decisions and communicate in a rational way, then his competence to stand trial 
would have been able to be properly assessed and determined.  It is difficult to understand how 
Hernandez, who was so affected by delusions and depression that he could not understand the 
nature and significance of the charges he was facing, could make any rational decisions in 
relation to his trial. 
A unitary test 
The federal law has developed different tests for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial in different contexts.  For example, although not a focus of this paper, it has been observed 
that the assessment of a defendant who lacks physical competence to stand trial is assessed 
under different tests from 18 U.S.C. § 4241 and Dusky.242  This paper has examined other ways 
in which the federal law has developed ad hoc tests for assessing a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial in circumstances where one test could more than adequately cover the assessment of 
all defendants whose competence to stand trial is in issue. 
As explained in Part III, in Moran, the Supreme Court ruled that the standard of competence 
required by the due process clause for pleading guilty and waiving one’s right to counsel is the 
same as the Dusky standard for assessing competence to stand trial.  Without overturning 
Moran, the Court in Edwards concluded a higher threshold of competence is required where a 
defendant wishes to dispense with counsel in a contested trial.  This aspect of the federal law 
can be accurately described as arbitrary and inconsistent.  This unsatisfactory state of affairs 
has come to pass because the Court appreciated in Edwards that the Dusky test, as applied in 
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Moran, was not an appropriate test for assessing a defendant’s competence to proceed without 
representation in a contested trial. 
On one level, the approach taken by the Court in Edwards was commendable.  The Court 
recognised in Edwards that a defendant’s competence cannot validly be assessed in a vacuum 
without reference to the context faced by the defendant.  The Court appreciated in Edwards 
what the majority failed to understand in Moran, namely that a defendant’s competence for one 
purpose in a criminal trial does not necessarily equate to competence for other purposes in the 
same trial.243  As Justice Blackmun colloquially said when dissenting in Moran, “a person who 
is ‘competent’ to play basketball is not thereby ‘competent’ to play the violin”.244 
The unsatisfactory state of the current law is not the product of the Court’s attempt in Edwards 
to draw a distinction between a defendant’s competence when he or she wishes to represent 
themselves at trial with other inquiries into a defendant’s competence.  The inconsistent and ad 
hoc state of the current law has arisen because the Court in Edwards elected not to address the 
shortcomings in the Dusky test. 
In contrast, the effective participation test has the advantage of being a unitary test that applies 
in all circumstances that the defendant may face in a criminal trial.  The effective participation 
test requires an assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand trial by asking whether or not, 
in each circumstance to be faced by the defendant, they can effectively participate in the 
proceeding.  The effective participation test recognizes that a defendant’s capacity to 
participate in one phase of their trial does not necessarily translate to them being able to 
effectively participate in another phase of their trial.  Thus, a defendant may be able to 
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effectively instruct counsel to enter a plea of guilty and provide instructions to support a plea 
of mitigation.  The same defendant may not, however, have the capacity to effectively 
participate in their trial if it is necessary for them to give evidence and be subject to cross-
examination.  Similarly, a defendant who has the capacity to provide effective instructions to 
counsel may not have the capacity to represent themself in a contested hearing. 
The recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in US v. Dubrule245 demonstrates the 
challenges that arise when assessing a defendant’s competence to represent him or herself and 
give evidence by applying the Dusky test. 
Dubrule was a medical practitioner who was ultimately convicted of unlawfully distributing 
controlled substances.  Prior to his trial Dubrule made a number of bizarre statements, including 
that the government was trying to kill him, that he was a world famous physician and that the 
Jewish people were responsible for destroying dams in New Orleans that led to extensive 
flooding during Hurricane Katrina.  Dubrule’s lawyer was granted leave to withdraw as counsel 
before the trial and Dubrule was permitted to represent himself, albeit with the limited 
assistance of a standby counsel.  He gave evidence in his own defense.  Counsel was assigned 
to Dubrule after he was convicted and before he was sentenced.  The assigned counsel 
immediately moved for an evaluation of Dubrule’s competence.  Dubrule was assessed by a 
psychologist, who concluded he “suffered from paranoid or grandiose delusions, and that such 
delusions rendered him incompetent to proceed to sentencing”.246  A second psychologist 
concluded that Dubrule suffered “personality and delusional disorders” that had “evidently 
impaired Dubrule’s ability to represent himself at trial” because, based on Dubrule’s raw 
intelligence, he “should have been able to either present a much more coherent defense or to 
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have accepted a plea agreement prior to trial”.247  A third psychologist, appointed at the request 
of the government “concluded that Dubrule suffered from personality and delusional 
disorders”.248  She concluded, however, that Dubrule’s condition “did not make him 
incompetent to stand trial, represent himself, or proceed to sentencing”.249  After reviewing the 
evidence of all three experts the District Court found the opinion of the third psychologist to 
be the most persuasive.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the District Court’s finding 
was not clearly erroneous.  In doing so the appellate court endorsed its earlier observations in 
United States v. Davis, in which it said, in cases where a criminal defendant elects to represent 
himself, “the mere fact that [he] espouses a far-fetched, or even bizarre, legal-defense theory 
is insufficient to clear the high hurdle for incompetency”.250  In responding to Dubrule’s 
argument on appeal that his over-confidence when representing himself was indicative of him 
being incompetent, the Court of Appeals said that “common sense” would suggest that a 
defendant who elects to represent himself after receiving a warning from the judge about the 
dangers inherent in self-representation is either over-confident or actually engaged in some 
form of “self-sabotage”.251  There was, however, a further and more plausible explanation, 
namely that Dubrule’s over-confidence when representing himself was symptomatic of his 
delusional beliefs in his own competence.  Although the appellate court examined the way 
Dubrule had represented himself when rejecting his appeal, it did so by expressly applying the 
Dusky test.  If the trial and appellate courts had the option of applying the more nuanced 
effective participation test then Dubrule’s real abilities to represent himself and give evidence 
would have been able to be fully evaluated. 
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The advantages of the effective participation test are also illustrated by returning to Moran’s 
case in which the defendant chose to dispense with his defense attorney and plead guilty in 
order not to resist the state’s plea for the death sentence to be imposed during the sentencing 
phase of Moran’s trial.  The reasons for Moran’s self-destructive behavior can be found in the 
law reports.  Moran’s own testimony was that he was being administered simultaneously four 
different prescription medications at the time he made his critical decisions and was also 
suffering “deep depression”.252  Had the effective participation test been applied to Moran’s 
case, the trial judge would have been compelled to inquire into whether or not Moran genuinely 
had the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his decision to dispense with his 
counsel and plead guilty.  As Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Stevens joined in 
dissenting, correctly noted, in Moran’s case the state sought to convict and sentence to death a 
defendant who was “helpless to defend himself”.253  This in turn seriously compromised 
Moran’s right to a fair trial and also undermined society’s interests in having a reliable and 
legitimate criminal justice system. 
Judicial responsibilities 
The trial court must conduct a competency hearing if there is reasonable cause to believe that 
the defendant satisfies the tests for not being competent to stand trial.  Failure to conduct a 
competency hearing in circumstances where such a hearing is required constitutes a violation 
of the defendant’s due process rights.254  Usually competency hearings are triggered by an 
application from defense counsel but a competence hearing can also be carried out upon the 
motion of a prosecutor or by the trial Judge acting on his or her own volition. 
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Currently, expert testimony constitutes the primary source of evidence from which a trial judge 
makes a determination as to whether or not the defendant is competent to stand trial.  However, 
as observed in Part III of this paper, the dependence which many judges now have upon the 
views of mental health experts when considering a defendant’s competence to stand trial has 
raised legitimate questions about whether or not trial judges are handing their judicial 
responsibilities to health professionals when determining the outcome of a competence hearing.  
The reasons why trial judges, when assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial, have 
developed a high level of dependence upon the opinions of health professionals include the 
knowledge imbalance between judges and mental health professionals on issues concerning a 
defendant’s mental health and the comparative inability of defense counsel to challenge 
medical evidence called by the prosecution concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
The effective participation test continues to rely upon expert medical testimony to assess a 
defendant’s competence to stand trial.  The effective participation test however requires more 
engagement from a trial judge when determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial 
particularly in cases where the defendant seeks to represent themself or engage in complex 
functions such as giving evidence.  In these cases, the trial judge is required to draw upon their 
experience and understanding of how a criminal trial is conducted and how a defendant’s rights 
to a fair trial are honored.  Thus, when making an assessment of a defendant’s competence to 
effectively participate in their trial, the trial judge is expected to make their own observations 
of the defendant, examine the defendant in court and consider other sources of information 
such as the observations of counsel and lay testimony.  In this type of inquiry judges and not 
just health professionals must bear the burden of fully assessing a defendant’s competence to 
participate effectively in their trial. 
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How then can judges reclaim the mantle of determining a defendant’s competence to stand 
trial?  The answer lies in judges acknowledging that while clinicians have valuable roles to 
play in assisting the court, their role is but one part of the equation for determining whether or 
not a defendant is competent to stand trial. 
This was demonstrated with resounding effect 20 years ago in U.S. v. Gigante,255 a case that 
involved charges against the head of the Genovese family, part of the criminal organization 
known as La Cosa Nostra.  In a hearing to assess Gigante’s competence to stand trial 
concerning labor payoffs, extortions, mail frauds and conspiracies to murder, four psychiatrists 
initially concluded he was not competent to stand trial.  In reaching their conclusions the 
psychiatrists took into account records from 1969 relating to Gigante’s regular attendances at 
a psychiatric hospital.  The federal judge however was concerned that Gigante was feigning 
his symptoms and held a hearing to determine the genuineness of Gigante’s alleged mental 
incapacity.  That hearing involved a detailed inquiry into Gigante’s conduct throughout most 
of his life and resulted in the Court concluding Gigante had, for decades, engaged in an 
elaborate sham in which he pretended to be mentally defective while at the same time he 
directed and controlled a sophisticated criminal enterprize.  The Court then presented its 
findings of fact to the psychiatrists who were directed to accept the Court’s findings as correct 
and advise the Court how those findings would affect their earlier determinations that Gigante 
was competent to stand trial.  In the next hearing,256 three of the four psychiatrists testified that 
the Court’s factual findings satisfied them that Gigante was competent to stand trial and that 
much, if not all of Gigante’s symptoms of mental illness had been feigned.  One of the 
psychiatrists appeared to be unwilling to accept the Court’s findings and continued to maintain 
                                                          
255  United States v. Gigante, 925 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
256  United States v. Gigante, 987 F. Supp. 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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Gigante was not competent to stand trial.  The Court concluded under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 that 
“Gigante [was] able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him 
and to assist properly in his own defense”.257  Gigante was convicted of multiple charges and 
sentenced to 12 years in prison.  His appeal against his convictions, in which he challenged, 
amongst other matters the determination he was competent to stand trial, was dismissed by the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.258 
The Court in Gigante demonstrated how trial judges can, “push back” from what might at first 
appear to be persuasive medical opinions concerning a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  
It is also instructive that Gigante involved a defendant who was a sophisticated malingerer.  
Defendants who feign their incompetence can be particularly challenging for all involved in a 
criminal trial.  One authority has noted “… seasoned clinicians often rely on their own 
individualistic perspectives in deciding when to assess the malingering ….  Unfortunately, the 
overuse of clinical judgment can be a source of misdiagnosis and inaccurate information given 
to the Court”.259  Ironically, psychiatrists have, in recent years developed tools that can now 
accurately assess the likelihood of a defendant feigning symptoms.  The designers of the 
E.C.S.T.-R Competency Screening Tool have, for example, also developed an “Atypical 
Presentation Scale” that is designed to identify feigned incompetence.  Studies have shown this 
is a particularly useful screen for identifying malingering incompetency to stand trial 
evaluations.260  Thus, while judges must be alert to the fallibilities of medical opinions, health 
professionals can play a significant role in providing information that may assist a judge in 
deciding whether or not a defendant is competent to stand trial. 
                                                          
257  Id. at 151. 
258  United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2nd Cir. 1999). 
259  Michael J. Vitacco, Richard Rogers, Jason Gabal and Janice Munizza, An Evaluation of Malingering Screens 
With Competency to Stand Trial Patients: A Known-Groups Comparison, L. & HUM. BEHAV., 31(3), 249, 250 
(2007). 
260  Vitacco. supra note 259, at 251 and 258. 
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Conclusion 
In his dissenting opinion in Watts v. Singletary,261 Judge Carnes of the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals lamented the deterioration of protections for an incompetent defendant.  He 
observed that the contemporary understanding of the federal tests for assessing a defendant’s 
competence to stand trial denies “… an American citizen the full benefit of an important trial 
right guaranteed [to] Englishman at least as early as the seventeenth century”.262  Judge Carnes’ 
reference to seventeenth century English law reflected a misunderstanding of the historical 
evolution of the common law governing competence to stand trial.  It can be said, however, 
that the emphasis that the 20th century common law placed upon a defendant’s ability to 
participate rationally in their trial provided greater protections to a defendant than 18 U.S.C. § 
4241.  The Dusky test has also been diluted with now less emphasis being given to a defendant’s 
ability to rationally understand the proceedings and consult their lawyer.  The current federal 
law has devolved into an unenlightened, ad hoc and muddled state of affairs.  Reform of this 
significant area of the federal law is well overdue. 
The deficiencies in the current federal law place at risk defendants with severe mental illness 
and other conditions that affect their ability to participate in their trial.  This in turn jeopardises 
the observance of the rights of these defendants to a fair trial.  Equally disturbing is that the 
current federal law governing an assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand trial risks 
undermining the integrity and dignity of the criminal law, a point observed by Justice Blackmun 
in Moran when he expressed his concern that the majority’s decision enabled the State to 
convict and execute a defendant who was “helpless to defend himself”.263  The current federal 
law also compromises the accuracy of verdicts by placing on trial defendants whose abilities 
                                                          
261  Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 1996). 
262  Id. at 1293. 
263  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 417 (1993). 
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to challenge allegations against them is undermined by their inability to participate effectively 
in their trial.  The current federal law also fails to give proper effect to a defendant’s right to 
self-determination by undermining the principle that it is the defendant who should make key 
decisions about the conduct of their trial and that in order to do so they should have the capacity 
to participate effectively in their trial. 
The current federal law governing a defendant’s competence to stand trial is almost entirely a 
product of judicial innovation.  The federal statute was substantially devised by federal judges 
serving on a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Supreme Court’s 
efforts to divine a test for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial led to the Court 
adopting recommendations of the Solicitor General in Dusky.  Regrettably, the Supreme Court 
has not seized opportunities presented in subsequent cases to address deficiencies in the Dusky 
test.  The Dusky test could evolve into an effective participation test by requiring an assessment 
of the defendant’s competence to stand trial to focus upon their capacity to understand relevant 
information, evaluate that information, make decisions in relation to that information and 
communicate their decisions.   
The federal law is antiquated and produces outcomes that are ad hoc and which at times are not 
reconcilable with the principles that underpin the requirement that incompetent defendants not 
stand trial.  Concerns about the adequacy of tests for determining the competence of defendants 
to stand trial are currently being examined in a number of cognate jurisdictions.264  Those 
jurisdictions which have, or are in the process of reviewing their respective tests for assessing 
the competence of a defendant to stand trial have identified significant shortcomings in tests 
                                                          
264  LAW COMMISSION OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 216; LAW COMMISSION OF VICTORIA, REVIEW OF 
THE CRIMES (MENTAL IMPAIRMENT OF UNFITNESS TO BE TRIED) ACT 1997 (2014); NEW SOUTH WALES LAW 
REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 226. 
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that are based upon the common law or which were devised in an era when the focus was on 
defendants found to be suffering from mental diseases or mental defects.  While there is no 
universally accepted formula for assessing a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the effective 
participation test has been accepted by the European Court of Human Rights and Scotland.  It 
is also the test recommended by the Law Commission for England and Wales to replace the 
common law standard that currently applies in that jurisdiction. 
The effective participation test has a number of advantages over the existing federal tests for 
determining a defendant’s competence to stand trial.  Those advantages include it being a 
unitary test that can apply to all phases of a criminal trial and that it can be engaged whenever 
a defendant’s competence to stand trial is in issue, regardless of the reasons for their 
incompetence.  The effective participation test relies to some extent upon the evidence of health 
professionals.  Nevertheless, the assessment of a defendant’s ability to effectively participate 
in their trial is quintessentially a judicial decision that is based upon a trial judge’s knowledge 
of what the defendant needs to understand, evaluate, decide and communicate in the context of 
their trial.  The effective participation test rightfully places the trial judge, and not medical 
professionals at the epicenter of the assessment of a defendant’s competence to stand trial. 
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Appendix 
State Legislative Definitions of Incompetence to Stand Trial 
 
 
State Legislative Definitions of Incompetence to Stand Trial 
 
  
Jurisdiction  Source of Law Definition of incompetence  
 
Alabama  ARCrP Rule 11.1  Rule 11.1. Definition of Incompetency 
A defendant is m ntally incompetent to stand trial or to be 
sentenced for an offense if that defendant lacks sufficient 
present ability to assist in his or her defense by consulting 
with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding of the facts and the legal proceedings against 
the defendant. 
 
Alaska  Alaska Stat AS 
12.47.100 to 110  
12.47.100. Incompetency to proceed 
(a) A defendant who, as a result of mental disease or defect, 
is incompetent because the defendant is unable to 
understand the proceedings against the defendant or to 
assist in the defendant’s own defense may not be tried, 
convicted, or sentenced for the commission of a crime so 
long as the incompetency exists. 
 
Arizona  A.R.S. 13-4501 to 17  13-4501 Definitions 
“Incompetent to stand trial” means that as a result of mental 
illness, defect or disability a defendant is unable to 
understand the nature and object of the proceeding or to 
assist in the defendant’s defense.  In the case of a person 
under eighteen years of age when the issue of competency 
is raised, incompetent to stand trial also means a person 
who does not have sufficient present ability to consult with 
the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding or who does not have a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against the person.  The 
presence of a mental illness, defect or disability alone is not 
grounds for finding a defendant incompetent to stand trial. 
 
Arkansas  Ark. Code § 5-2-302.   
 
5-2-302 Lack of fitness to proceed generally  
No person who lacks the capacity to understand a 
proceeding against him or her or to assist effectively in his 
or her own defense as a result of mental disease or defect 
shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of 
an offense so long as the incapacity endures.  
 
A court shall not enter judgment of acquittal on the ground 
of mental disease or defect against a defendant who lacks 
the capacity to understand a proceeding against him or her 
or to assist effectively in his or her own defense as a result 
of mental disease or defect. 
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California  Ca. Penal Code  § 1367 
to 1376 
1367. Mentally incompetent persons; trial or 
punishment prohibited; application of specified sections  
A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment or have 
his or her probation, mandatory supervision, post release 
community supervision, or parole revoked while that person 
is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally 
incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of 
mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant 
is unable to understand the nature of the criminal 
proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense 
in a rational manner. 
 
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat § 16-
8.5-101  
 
 
16-8.5- 101. Definitions 
(11) “Incompetent to proceed” means that, as a result of a 
mental disability or developmental disability, the defendant 
does not have sufficient present ability to consult with the 
defendant's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding in order to assist in the defense, or that, as a 
result of a mental disability or developmental disability, the 
defendant does not have a rational and factual 
understanding of the criminal proceedings. 
 
Connecticut  Conn. Gen Stat. § 54 to 
56d.  
54 – 56D. Competency to stand trial 
(a) Competency requirement.  Definition.  A defendant 
shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the 
defendant is not competent.  For the purposes of this 
section, a defendant is not competent if the defendant is 
unable to understand the proceedings against him or her to 
assist in his or her own defense.  
 
Delaware  
 
11 Del C. § 404. 404. Confinement in Delaware Psychiatric Center of 
persons too mentally ill to stand trial; requiring State to 
prove prima facie case in such circumstances; 
adjustment of sentences 
 
(a) Whenever the court is satisfied, after hearing, that an 
accused person, because of mental illness or serious mental 
disorder, is unable to understand the nature of the 
proceedings against the accused, or to give evidence in the 
accused's own defense or to instruct counsel on the 
accused's own behalf, the court may order the accused 
person to be confined and treated in the Delaware 
Psychiatric Center until the accused person is capable of 
standing trial. However, upon motion of the defendant, the 
court may conduct a hearing to determine whether the State 
can make out a prima facie case against the defendant, and 
if the State fails to present sufficient evidence to constitute 
a prima facie case, the court shall dismiss the charge. This 
dismissal shall have the same effect as a judgment of 
acquittal. 
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Florida  F.S.A  §  916.106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.S.A § 916.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.S.A. § 916.3012 
Definitions. (11) “Incompetent to proceed” means unable 
to proceed at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, 
which includes the trial of the case, pretrial hearings 
involving questions of fact on which the defendant might be 
expected to testify, entry of a plea, proceedings for violation 
of probation or violation of community control, sentencing, 
and hearings on issues regarding a defendant's failure to 
comply with court orders or conditions or other matters in 
which the mental competence of the defendant is necessary 
for a just resolution of the issues being considered. 
 
(1) A defendant is incompetent to proceed within the 
meaning of this chapter if the defendant does not have 
sufficient present ability to consult with her or his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or if the 
defendant has no rational, as well as factual, understanding 
of the proceedings against her or him.  
 
(2) Mental health experts appointed pursuant to s 916.115 
shall first determine whether the defendant has a mental 
illness and, if so, consider the factors related to the issue of 
whether the defendant meets the criteria for competence to 
proceed as described in subsection (1)…  
 
(3) In considering the issue of competence to proceed, an 
examining expert shall first consider and specifically 
include in his or her report the defendant’s capacity to:  
(a) Appreciate the charges or allegations against the 
defendant.  
(b) Appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, if 
applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings against 
the defendant.  
(c) Understand the adversarial nature of the legal process.  
(d) Disclose to counsel facts pertinent to the proceedings at 
issue.  
(e) Manifest appropriate courtroom behaviour 
(f) Testify relevantly  
In addition, an examining expert shall consider and include 
in his or her report any other factor deemed relevant by the 
expert.  
… 
 
(1) A defendant whose suspected mental condition is 
intellectual disability or autism is incompetent to proceed 
within the meaning of this chapter if the defendant does not 
have sufficient present ability to consult with the 
defendant’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding or if the defendant has no rational, as well as 
factual, understanding of the proceedings against the 
defendant.  
 
Georgia  Ga. Code. Ann. § 15-
11-651 and  17-7-130.  
17-7-130 (b)(1)Plea of mental incompetency to stand 
trial 
If an accused files a motion requesting a competency 
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evaluation, the court may order the department to conduct 
an evaluation by a physician or licensed psychologist to 
determine the accused's mental competency to stand trial 
and, if such physician or licensed psychologist determines 
the accused to be mentally incompetent to stand trial, to 
make recommendations as to restoring the accused to 
competency. If the accused is a child, the department shall 
be authorized to place such child in a secure facility 
designated by the department.  
 
15-11-651. Definition for incompetency for a child 
(Juvenile Code)  
(3) “Incompetent to proceed” means lacking sufficient 
present ability to understand the nature and object of the 
proceedings, to comprehend his or her own situation in 
relation to the proceedings, and to assist his or her attorney 
in the preparation and presentation of his or her case in all 
adjudication, disposition, or transfer hearings. Such term 
shall include consideration of a child's age or immaturity. 
 
Hawaii HRS §  704-403 704-403. Physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect 
excluding fitness to proceed  
No person who as a result of a physical or mental disease, 
disorder, or defect lacks capacity to understand the 
proceedings against the person or to assist in the person’s 
own defense shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the 
commission of an offense so long as such incapacity 
endures.  
 
Idaho  Idaho Code Ann § 18-
210 to 212 
18-210. Lack of capacity to understand proceedings – 
delay of trial 
No person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks 
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to 
assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced 
or punished for the commission of an offense so long as 
such incapacity endures.  
 
Illinois  725 III. Comp. Stat. 
5/104-11 to 104-23 
104-10. Presumption of Fitness; Fitness Standard  
A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial or to plead, 
and to be sentenced.  A defendant is unfit if, because of his 
mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the 
nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to 
assist in his defense.  
 
Indiana  Ind. Code 35-36-3 to 4.  35-36-3-1.Hearing; psychiatric examination; delay or 
continuance of trial; confinement in psychiatric 
institution; competency restoration services; transmittal 
of information to NICS(a) If at any time before the final 
submission of any criminal case to the court or the jury 
trying the case, the court has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the defendant lacks the ability to understand 
the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense, 
the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to 
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determine whether the defendant has that ability.  The court 
shall appoint two (2) or three (3) competent, disinterested:  
(1) psychiatrists;  
(2) psychologists endorsed by the Indiana state board 
of examiners in psychology as health service 
providers in psychology; or 
(3) physicians;  
who have expertise in determining competency.  
 
Iowa  Iowa Code 812.3 to 
812.9  
812.3 Mental incompetency of accused.  
If at any stage of a criminal proceeding the defendant or the 
defendant’s attorney, upon application to the court, alleges 
specific facts showing that the defendants is suffering from 
a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from 
appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or 
assisting effectively in the defense, the court shall suspend 
further proceedings and determine if probable cause exists 
to sustain the allegations.  The applicant has the burden of 
establishing the probable cause.  
 
The court may on its own motion schedule a hearing to 
determine probable cause if the defendant or defendant's 
attorney has failed or refused to make an application under 
this section and the court finds that there are specific facts 
showing that a hearing should be held on that question. The 
defendant shall not be compelled to testify at the hearing 
and any testimony of the defendant given during the hearing 
shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt, except such 
testimony shall be admissible in proceedings under section 
811.2, subsection 8, and section 811.8, and in perjury 
proceedings. 
 
2. Upon a finding of probable cause sustaining the 
allegations, the court shall suspend further criminal 
proceedings and order the defendant to undergo a 
psychiatric evaluation to determine whether the defendant is 
suffering a mental disorder which prevents the defendant 
from appreciating the charge, understanding the 
proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense. 
 
Kansas Kan. Crim. Proc. Code 
Ann 22-3301 to 3306 
22-3301. Definitions  
(1) For the purpose of this article, a person is “incompetent 
to stand trial” when he is charged with a crime and, because 
of mental illness or defect is unable: 
(a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings 
against him; or 
(b) to make or assist in making his defense. 
(2) Whenever the words “competent,” “competency,” 
“incompetent” and “incompetency” are used without 
qualification in this article, they shall refer to the 
defendant's competency or incompetency to stand trial, as 
defined in subsection (1) of this section. 
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Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
504.060, 504.090 to 
110.  
504.060 Definitions for chapter 
(4) “Incompetency to stand trial” means, as a result of 
mental condition, lack of capacity to appreciate the nature 
and consequences of the proceedings against one or to 
participate rationally in one’s own defense. 
 
Louisiana  La. Code Crim. Proc. 
Ann. Art 641-649.  
641. Mental incapacity to proceed definition 
Mental incapacity to proceed exists when, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, a defendant presently lacks the 
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to 
assist in his defense. 
 
Maine  15 MRSA 101-D.  
 
 
101-D. Mental examination of persons accused of crime 
Competency to proceed 
The court may for cause shown order that the defendant be 
examined to evaluate the defendant's competency to 
proceed as provided in this subsection. 
A. Upon motion by the defendant or by the State, or upon 
its own motion, a court having jurisdiction in any criminal 
case may for cause shown order that the defendant be 
examined by the State Forensic Service for evaluation of 
the defendant's competency to proceed…  
 
Maryland Md. Code Ann Crim. 
Proc 3-101 to 3-108.  
3-101. Definitions  
(f) “Incompetent to stand trial” means not able: 
(1) to understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or 
(2) to assist in one's defense. 
 
Massachusetts  Mass. Gen. Laws ch  
123- § 15. 
15. Competency to stand trial or criminal responsibility; 
examination; period of observation; reports; hearing; 
commitment; delinquents 
Whenever a court of competent jurisdiction doubts whether 
a defendant in a criminal case is competent to stand trial or 
is criminally responsible by reason of mental illness or 
mental defect, it may at any stage of the proceedings after 
the return of an indictment or the issuance of a criminal 
complaint against the defendant, order an examination of 
such defendant to be conducted by one or more qualified 
physicians or one or more qualified psychologists. 
Whenever practicable, examinations shall be conducted at 
the court house or place of detention where the person is 
being held. When an examination is ordered, the court shall 
instruct the examining physician or psychologist in the law 
for determining mental competence to stand trial and 
criminal responsibility. 
 
Michigan  Mich. Comp. Laws § 
330.2020 to 330.2044 
Sec. 1020. (1) A defendant to a criminal charge shall be 
presumed competent to stand trial. He shall be determined 
incompetent to stand trial only if he is incapable because of 
his mental condition of understanding the nature and object 
of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense 
in a rational manner. The court shall determine the capacity 
of a defendant to assist in his defense by his ability to 
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perform the tasks reasonably necessary for him to perform 
in the preparation of his defense and during his trial. 
Minnesota  Minn. R. Crim. P. Rule 
20.01 
Subd. 2. Competency to Participate in the Proceedings.  
A defendant is incompetent and must not plead, be tried, or 
be sentenced if the defendant lacks ability to: 
(a) rationally consult with counsel; or 
(b) understand the proceedings or participate in the defense 
due to mental illness or deficiency. 
 
Mississippi Miss. Rules Crim. Proc.  
 
(Text of rule effective 
July 1, 2017).  
 
Rule 12.1 Mental Competency; Definition  
(a) Mental competency.  There is a presumption of mental 
competency.  In order to be deemed mentally competent, a 
defendant must have the ability to perceive and understand 
the nature of the proceedings, to communicate rationally 
with the defendant’s attorney about the case, to recall 
relevant facts, and to testify in the defendant’s own defense, 
if appropriate.  The presence of a mental illness, defect, or 
disability alone is not grounds for finding a defendant 
incompetent to stand trial.  If as a result of mental illness, 
defect, or disability, a defendant lacks mental competency, 
then the defendant shall not be tried, convicted, or 
sentenced for a criminal offense.  
 
(b) Mental Illness, Defect, or Disability.  Mental illness, 
defect, or disability means a psychiatric or neurological 
disorder that is evidenced by behavioural or emotional 
symptoms including congenital mental conditions, 
conditions resulting from injury or disease, or 
developmental disabilities.  
 
Missouri  Mo. Rev. Stat § 552.020  552.020 Lack of mental capacity bar to trial or 
conviction – psychiatric examination, when, report of—
commitment to hospital, when – statements of accused 
in admissible 
1. No person who as a result of mental disease or defect 
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or 
to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or 
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the 
incapacity endures. 
 
Montana  Mont. Code Ann. § 46-
14-103, 202, 206, 221, 
and 222 
46-14-103. Mental disease or disorder or developmental 
disability excluding fitness to proceed 
A person who, as a result of mental disease or disorder or 
developmental disability, is unable to understand the 
proceedings against the person or to assist in the person's 
own defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for 
the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity 
endures. 
 
Nebraska  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
1822 
 
 
29-1822. Mental incompetency of accused after crime 
commission; effect; capital punishment; stay of 
execution 
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Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
1823 
A person who becomes mentally incompetent after the 
commission of a crime or misdemeanor shall not be tried 
for the offense during the continuance of the incompetency. 
If, after the verdict of guilty and before judgment 
pronounced, such person becomes mentally incompetent, 
then no judgment shall be given while such incompetency 
shall continue; and if, after judgment and before execution 
of the sentence, such person shall become mentally 
incompetent, then in case the punishment be capital, the 
execution thereof shall be stayed until the recovery of such 
person from the incompetency. 
 
29-1823.  Mental incompetency of accused before trial; 
determination by judge; effect; costs; hearing; 
commitment proceeding 
(1) If at any time prior to trial it appears that the accused 
has become mentally incompetent to stand trial, such 
disability may be called to the attention of the district court 
by the county attorney, by the accused, or by any person for 
the accused. The judge of the district court of the county 
where the accused is to be tried shall have the authority to 
determine whether or not the accused is competent to stand 
trial…  
 
Nevada  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 
178.399 to 178.460 
178.400 Incompetent person cannot be tried or 
adjudged to punishment for public offense  
1. A person may not be tried or adjudged to punishment for 
a public offense while incompetent. 
2. For the purposes of this section, “incompetent” means 
that the person does not have the present ability to: 
(a) Understand the nature of the criminal charges against 
the person; 
(b) Understand the nature and purpose of the court 
proceedings; or 
(c) Aid and assist the person’s counsel in the defense at any 
time during the proceedings with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding. 
 
New Hampshire  N.H. Rev. Stat. § 
135:17  
135:17 Competency; Commitment for Evaluation 
II … competency evaluations shall address:  
(a) Whether the defendant suffers from a mental disease or 
defect; and 
(b) Whether the defendant has a rational and factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him or her, and 
sufficient present ability to consult with and assist his or her 
lawyer on the case with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding. 
 
New Jersey  N.J. Stat. Ann § 2C:4-5, 
4-6.  
2C: 4-4 Mental incompetence excluding fitness to 
proceed  
a. No person who lacks capacity to understand the 
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall 
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be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an 
offense so long as such incapacity endures. 
b. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand 
trial on criminal charges if the proofs shall establish: 
(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate 
his presence in relation to time, place and things; and 
(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he 
comprehends: 
(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal 
offense; 
(b) That there is a judge on the bench; 
(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict 
him of a criminal charge; 
(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him 
against that charge; 
(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental 
ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place 
where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to 
testify and understands the right not to testify; 
(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon 
evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, 
that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to 
plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a 
guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon 
such entry of a guilty plea; and 
(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate 
presentation of his defense. 
 
New Mexico NMRA, Crim. UJI 14-
5104.  
UJI 14-5104. Determination of Present Competency 
… A person is competent to stand trial if he:  
1. understands the nature and significance of the 
criminal proceedings against him;  
2. has a factual understanding of the criminal charges; 
and 
3. is able to assist his attorney in his defense. 
 
New York  N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 
730.10 to 730.70  
730.10 Definitions  
1. “Incapacitated person” means a defendant who as a result 
of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the 
proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense. 
 
North Carolina  N.C. Gen. Stat § 15A 
1001-1009 
15A-1001. No proceedings when defendant mentally 
incapacitated; exception  
(a) No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or 
punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or 
defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of 
the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own 
situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his 
defense in a rational or reasonable manner. This condition 
is hereinafter referred to as “incapacity to proceed.” 
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(b) This section does not prevent the court from going 
forward with any motions which can be handled by counsel 
without the assistance of the defendant. 
 
North Dakota  NDCC § 12.1-04-04 12.1-04-04. Disposition of mentally unfit defendants  
No person who, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks 
capacity to understand the proceedings against the person or 
to assist in the person's own defense shall be tried, 
convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so 
long as such incapacity endures. 
 
Ohio  Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 
2945.37-39 
5924.501 Competence to stand trial  
(F) An accused is presumed to be competent to stand trial. 
If, after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, because of the accused's present mental 
condition, the accused is incapable of understanding the 
nature and objective of the proceedings against the accused 
or of assisting in the accused's defense, the court shall find 
the accused incompetent to stand trial and shall enter an 
order authorized by section 5924.503 of the Revised Code. 
 
Oklahoma  Okla. Stat. tit. 22 § 
115.1 to 1175.8 
1175.1 Definitions  
2. “Incompetent” or “incompetency” means the present 
inability of a person arrested for or charged with a crime to 
understand the nature of the charges and proceedings 
brought against him or her and to effectively and rationally 
assist in his or her defense. 
 
Oregon  Or. Re. Stat. § 161.360 
to 161.370 
161.360 Fitness to proceed; mental disease or defect   
(1) If, before or during the trial in any criminal case, the 
court has reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed 
by reason of incapacity, the court may order an examination 
in the manner provided in ORS 161.365. 
(2) A defendant may be found incapacitated if, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, the defendant is unable: 
(a) To understand the nature of the proceedings against the 
defendant; or 
(b) To assist and cooperate with the counsel of the 
defendant; or 
(c) To participate in the defense of the defendant. 
 
Pennsylvania Pa Stat. Ann § 7402-
7406 
7402. Incompetence to proceed on criminal charges and 
lack of criminal responsibility as defense 
(a) Definition of Incompetency. Whenever a person who 
has been charged with a crime is found to be substantially 
unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings 
against him or to participate and assist in his defense, he 
shall be deemed incompetent to be tried, convicted or 
sentenced so long as such incapacity continues. 
 
Rhode Island  R.I. Gen Laws § 40.1-
5.3-3 
Definitions (5) “Incompetent” or “incompetency” means 
mentally incompetent to stand trial. A person is mentally 
incompetent to stand trial if he or she is unable to 
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understand the character and consequences of the 
proceedings against him or her or is unable properly to 
assist in his or her defense. 
 
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann §44-23-
410 to 460 
44-23-410 Determining fitness to stand trial; time for 
conducting examination; extension; independent 
examination; competency distinguished.  
(A) Whenever a judge of the circuit court or family court 
has reason to believe that a person on trial before him, 
charged with the commission of a criminal offense or civil 
contempt, is not fit to stand trial because the person lacks 
the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to 
assist in his own defense as a result of a lack of mental 
capacity, the judge shall: 
(1) order examination of the person by two examiners 
designated by the Department of Mental Health … or  
(2) order the person committed for examination and 
observation to an appropriate facility … 
 
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 
23A – 10A-1 to 16. 
23A-10A-1 Definition of mental incompetency  
The term, “mentally incompetent to proceed,” as used in 
this chapter, means the condition of a person who is 
suffering from a mental disease, developmental disability, 
as defined in § 27B-1-18, or psychological, physiological, 
or etiological condition rendering him mentally 
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the 
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or 
to assist properly in his defense. 
 
 27B-1-18 
A developmental disability is any severe, chronic disability 
of a person that: 
(1) Is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or 
combination of mental and physical impairments; 
(2) Is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two; 
(3) Is likely to continue indefinitely; 
(4) Results in substantial functional limitations in three or 
more of the following areas of major life activity: self-care, 
receptive and expressive language, learning, mobility, self-
direction, capacity for independent living, and economic 
self-sufficiency; and 
(5) Reflects the person's need for an array of generic 
services, met through a system of individualized planning 
and supports over an extended time, including those of a 
life-long duration. 
 
23A-10A-3 Hearing on mental condition – Mental 
examination and report  
At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for 
an offense and prior to the sentencing of the defendant, the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney may file a motion for 
a hearing to determine the mental competency of the 
defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or shall order 
such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable 
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cause to believe that the defendant may presently be 
suffering from a mental disease or developmental disability, 
or other conditions set forth in § 23A-10A-1, rendering him 
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding 
against him or to assist properly in his defense. Prior to the 
date of hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or 
psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, 
and that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with 
the court, pursuant to the provisions of §§ 23A-46-1 and 
23A-46-2. The hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the 
provisions of § 23A-46-3. 
 
Tennessee  Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-
7-301  
Not included as a definition in § 33-7-301.  
 
33-7-301 Outpatient evaluation; court ordered 
hospitalisation; reports 
(a)(1) When a defendant charged with a criminal offense is 
believed to be incompetent to stand trial, or there is a 
question about the defendant's mental capacity at the time 
of the commission of the crime, the criminal, circuit, or 
general sessions court judge may, upon the judge's own 
motion or upon petition by the district attorney general or 
by the attorney for the defendant and after hearing, order 
the defendant to be evaluated on an outpatient basis. The 
evaluation shall be done by the community mental health 
center or licensed private practitioner designated by the 
commissioner to serve the court or, if the evaluation cannot 
be made by the center or the private practitioner, on an 
outpatient basis by the state hospital or the state-supported 
hospital designated by the commissioner to serve the court. 
If, and only if, the outpatient evaluator concludes that 
further evaluation and treatment are needed, the court may 
order the defendant hospitalized, and if in a department 
facility, in the custody of the commissioner for not more 
than thirty (30) days for further evaluation and treatment for 
competence to stand trial subject to the availability of 
suitable accommodations. 
 
(4)(A) … if it is believed that a defendant is incompetent to 
assist counsel in preparation for, or otherwise participate in, 
the post-conviction proceeding, the court may, upon its own 
motion, order that the defendant be evaluated on either an 
outpatient or inpatient basis, as may be appropriate…  
 
Texas Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 
Ann. Art. 46B.003  
Art 46B.003  
(a) A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does 
not have: 
(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; 
or 
(2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against the person. 
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(b) A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and 
shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved 
incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 77-
15-2 
77-15-2 “Incompetent to proceed” defined  
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is incompetent to 
proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder or mental 
retardation resulting either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding 
of the proceedings against him or of the punishment 
specified for the offense charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to 
participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding. 
 
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit 13 § 
4184-4822  
4817. Competency to Stand Trial; Determination  
(a) A person shall not be tried for a criminal offense if he or 
she is incompetent to stand trial. 
 
(b) If a person indicted, complained or informed against for 
an alleged criminal offense, an attorney or guardian acting 
in his or her behalf, or the State, at any time before final 
judgment, raises before the court before which such person 
is tried or is to be tried, the issue of whether such person is 
incompetent to stand trial, or if the court has reason to 
believe that such person may not be competent to stand 
trial, a hearing shall be held before such court at which 
evidence shall be received and a finding made regarding his 
or her competency to stand trial. However, in cases where 
the court has reason to believe that such person may be 
incompetent to stand trial due to a mental disease or mental 
defect, such hearing shall not be held until an examination 
has been made and a report submitted by an examining 
psychiatrist in accordance with sections 4814-4816 of this 
title. 
 
(c) A person who has been found incompetent to stand trial 
for an alleged offense may be tried for that offense if, upon 
subsequent hearing, such person is found by the court 
having jurisdiction of his or her trial for the offense to have 
become competent to stand trial. 
 
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
169.1 
19.2 – 169.1. Raising question of competency to stand 
trial or plead; evaluation and determination of 
competency 
 
A. Raising competency issue; appointment of evaluators 
--If, at any time after the attorney for the defendant has 
been retained or appointed and before the end of trial, the 
court finds, upon hearing evidence or representations of 
counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the 
Commonwealth, that there is probable cause to believe that 
the defendant, whether a juvenile transferred pursuant to § 
106 
 
16.1-269.1 or adult, lacks substantial capacity to understand 
the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his 
own defense, the court shall order that a competency 
evaluation be performed by at least one psychiatrist or 
clinical psychologist … 
 
Washington  Wash. Rev. Code § 
10.77.010 to 10.77.092  
10.77.010 Definitions  
(15) “Incompetency” means a person lacks the capacity to 
understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her 
or to assist in his or her own defense as a result of mental 
disease or defect. 
 
West Virginia  W.Va.Code § 27-6A-1 
to 5 
27-6A-3. Competency of defendant to stand trial 
determination; preliminary finding; hearing; evidence; 
disposition 
The court of record pursuant to a preliminary finding or 
hearing on the issue of a defendant’s competency to stand 
trial and with due consideration of any forensic evaluation 
conducted pursuant to sections two and three of this article 
shall make a finding of fact upon a preponderance of the 
evidence as to the defendant’s competency to stand trial 
based on whether or not the defendant has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding and whether he or she has 
a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or her. 
 
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 971.13 971.13. Competency  
(1) No person who lacks substantial mental capacity to 
understand the proceedings or assist in his or her own 
defense may be tried, convicted or sentenced for the 
commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures. 
(2) A defendant shall not be determined incompetent to 
proceed solely because medication has been or is being 
administered to restore or maintain competency. 
(3) The fact that a defendant is not competent to proceed 
does not preclude any legal objection to the prosecution 
under s. 971.31 which is susceptible of fair determination 
prior to trial and without the personal participation of the 
defendant. 
(4) The fact that a defendant is not competent to proceed 
does not preclude a hearing under s. 968.38(4) or (5) unless 
the probable cause finding required to be made at the 
hearing cannot be fairly made without the personal 
participation of the defendant. 
 
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-
301 to 303 
7-11-302. Trial or Punishment of Person Lacking 
Mental Capacity  
(a) No person shall be tried, sentenced or punished for the 
commission of an offense while, as a result of mental illness 
or deficiency, he lacks the capacity, to: 
(i) Comprehend his position; 
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